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Sommario
Una Challenging Network (CN) e` un paradigma di rete che si
adatta ai problemi dell’ambiente, al fine di garantire la comuni-
cazione tra i nodi. Uno dei problemi piu` importanti di una CN
e` quello di garantire la cooperazione sicura tra i nodi. In questo
lavoro descrivo il problema della cooperazione sicura in tre tipi di
CNs: le Underwater Acoustic Networks (UANs), le Delay Tolerant
Networks (DTNs) e le Publish/Subscribe Networks (PSNs). Una
UAN e` un paradigma che permette la comunicazione tra nodi sub-
acquei equipaggiati con modem acustici. Poiche` il canale acustico
per sua natura e` un canale aperto, un avversario, su cientemente
equipaggiato, potrebbe intercettare i messaggi che attraversano la
rete. In questo lavoro descrivo una suite crittografica, in grado di
proteggere la comunicazione tra i nodi acustici. Una DTN e` un
paradigma di rete che garantisce la consegna dei messaggi anche in
presenza di partizioni della rete. Una DTN si basa sull’assunzione
implicita che i nodi cooperino per il routing dei messaggi. Co-
munque, questa assunzione non puo` essere soddisfatta quando sono
presenti nella rete nodi maliziosi che agiscono da blackholes in modo
da attrarre o cestinare volontariamente i messaggi. In questo la-
voro propongo un protocollo basato sul concetto di reputazione al
fine di contrastare i nodi blackholes. Una PSN e’ un paradigma
di rete che permette la comunicazione da nodi publishers a nodi
subscribers, attraverso una infrastruttura chiamata Dispatcher. In
questo lavoro presento una PSN sicura in grado di supportare la
cooperazione tra le organizzazioni. Il servizio e` basato sulla nozione
di gruppo di sicurezza, composto da un insieme di brokers che rap-
presentano le organizzazioni e che garantiscono la confidenzialita` e
l’integrita` nella consegna dei messaggi.
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Abstract
A Challenging Network (CN) is a network paradigm adapting to
the many issues of the environment in order to guarantee the com-
munication among nodes. One of the most important issues of a
CN is the problem of secure cooperation among nodes. In fact,
an attacker, either internal or external, may constitute a threat
for the network. In this work I investigate the problem of secure
cooperation in three kinds of CNs: the Underwater Acoustic Net-
works (UANs), the Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) and the Pub-
lish/Subscribe Networks (PSNs). A UAN is a network paradigm
allowing communication among underwater nodes equipped with
acoustic modems. Since the acoustic channel is an open medium,
an attacker conveniently equipped could intercept the messages
traversing the network. In this work I describe a cryptographic
suite, aimed at protecting the communication among underwa-
ter acoustic nodes. A DTN is a network paradigm guaranteeing
message delivery even in presence of network partitions. A DTN
relies on the implicit assumption that nodes cooperate towards
message forwarding. However, this assumption cannot be satisfied
when there are malicious nodes acting as blackholes and voluntar-
ily attracting and dropping messages. In this work I propose a
reputation-based protocol for contrasting blackholes. A PSN is a
network paradigm allowing communication from publishers to sub-
scribers by means of an infrastructure, called Dispatcher. In this
work I present a secure PSN conceived to support cooperation be-
tween organizations. The service is based on the notion of security
group, an overlay composed of brokers representing organizations
that guarantees confidentiality and integrity in end-to-end delivery
of messages and supports clients mobility.
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Introduction
Cominciate col fare cio` che e` necessario, poi cio` che e`
possibile. E all’improvviso vi sorprenderete a fare
l’impossibile.
Francesco d’Assisi (1182–1226)
1.1 Introduction
A Challenging Network (CN) is a network which is able to adapt
to the specificity of the environment. An example of CN is the
Underwater Acoustic Network (UAN) [1], which is characterized
by long delays, high packet loss and low bandwidth. Another
example of CN can be considered the Delay Tolerant Network
(DTN) [2], which is a partitioned network, where the connectiv-
ity among nodes is not guaranteed. As a further example of CN,
we have the Publish/Subscribe Network (PSN) [3], which is char-
acterized by the presence of many clients, acting one independently
on the others.
Each CN presents issues depending on the specificity of the
environment. However, we can classify them in three families: a)
static networks, b) dynamic networks, c) mixed networks.
In the static networks, all the nodes are well known before the
network deployment and usually they do not change during the
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network lifetime. An example of static networks is the UAN, which
has a limited number of nodes, as they are very expensive.
In the dynamic networks, the nodes are not known before the
network deployment, because they can add to the network or re-
move from it dynamically during the network lifetime. An example
of dynamic network is the DTN, which is composed of di↵erent
types of nodes (e.g. smartphones, laptops).
Finally, in the mixed networks there are some nodes that are
known before the network deployment and some other nodes which
change during the network lifetime. An example of mixed network
is the PSN, which is composed of an infrastructure of brokers, act-
ing as dispatcher for the messages, and many clients. The brokers
usually are static, while the clients change dynamically.
Since it is not possible to discuss all the problems related to
a CN in this work, we focus only on the problems related to the
secure cooperation among nodes. In particular, this property must
be guaranteed even in presence of one or many attackers, either
external or internal to the network.
In this chapter we discuss the requirements of each family of
CN in order to guarantee the secure cooperation among nodes.
Furthermore, we analyze the e↵ects of an external or internal attack
on the network.
The chapter is organized as follows: in Section 1.2 we describe
the security issues, then in Section 1.3 we give some evaluation
criteria for the networks comparison. Sections 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6
describe the static networks, the dynamic networks and the mixed
networks, respectively. In Section 1.7 we compare all the families.
Finally in Section 1.8 we give our conclusions.
1.2 Security Issues
A challenging network may be subjected to many threats and ma-
licious attacks [4–7]. In this work we consider only attacks acting
against the cooperation among nodes. We define the secure co-
operation among nodes as the property of the network, according
to which: a) a message sent from a sender to a destination is not
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altered or dropped during the routing process, b) a message from
the sender to a destination is not read during the routing process
by unauthorized sources.
An attack against the secure cooperation can be performed by
two types of adversaries:
• external attacker : the adversary does not belong to the net-
work, but he has access to the communication channel, which
generally is open.
• internal attacker : the adversary is a node of the network.
In this case he has access to the messages which receives
for routing. He can also access to all the other information
shared by the nodes (e.g. shared keys).
In order to protect the network from an external attacker, it
is su cient to protect the communication channel for example
by means of a cryptographic suite which encrypts and authenti-
cates messages. If we want to protect the network from an inter-
nal attacker, instead, the problem is much more complicated, be-
cause it needs a mechanism guaranteeing that nodes behaves as ex-
pected. This mechanism may include additional software or hard-
ware which a node must be equipped with or an external trusted
entity acting as a watchdog for the network.
1.3 Evaluation Criteria
In order to compare the challenging networks, we define the fol-
lowing metrics, aimed at evaluating their performance.
1.3.1 Security Requirements
This metric specifies what are the external structures used by the
network to guarantee the secure cooperation. The security require-
ments include:
• Infrastructure. This metric specifies whether the network
needs an infrastructure or not.
20 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
• Additional Hardware. This metric specifies whether every
node of the network needs an additional hardware, such as a
Trusted Platform Module (TPM), able to perform the remote
attestation of nodes [8–10].
• Additional Software. This metric specifies whether every node
of the network needs an additional software, such as a Watch-
dog mechanism, able to monitor the nodes behavior and ex-
clude from the network malicious nodes [11].
1.3.2 Attacks E↵ects
This metric specifies what kind of e↵ect an attack may produce on
the network. It includes:
• External Attacks E↵ects. This metric specifies what kind of
e↵ect an external attack may produce on the network.
• Internal Attacks E↵ects. This metric specifies what kind of
e↵ect an internal attack may produce on the network.
1.4 Static Networks
A Static Network (SN) is a network paradigm where: a) nodes
are well known before the network deployment, b) the number of
nodes is constant. An example of SN is the Underwater Acoustic
Network (UAN), which is a network paradigm allowing communi-
cation among underwater nodes equipped with acoustic modems.
A UAN can be used for many purposes such as ocean sampling, en-
vironment monitoring, undersea explorations, tactical surveillance
and disaster prevention. Figure 2.1 shows an example of a UAN.
The Figure shows a Base Station (BS), able to communicate both
with a Command and Control Centre (C3), located in the land,
and many underwater acoustic nodes.
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Figure 1.1: A UAN.
1.4.1 Security Requirements
Due to its nature, generally a SN is an infrastructured network.
The presence of an infrastructure allows the nodes to e ciently
communicate and exchange information.
In order to guarantee the secure cooperation among nodes, the
infrastructure can be exploited. For example, there could be a
central base station playing the role of authenticating all the nodes
of the network or acting as a Watchdog for the network. This
means that it is not needed that nodes are equipped with additional
hardware in order to support secure cooperation, although each
node could be equipped with a TPM.
In order to exchange messages with the base station (e.g. for
the authentication), the software of each node must be extended
with algorithms and protocols supporting that.
1.4.2 Attacks E↵ects
Let us assume that the network has a mechanism which authen-
ticates all the nodes. Since the nodes are well known before the
network deployment and there is a mechanism for nodes authenti-
cation, for an attacker it is di cult to add himself to the network
as an additional node. This means that he can act only in the fol-
lowing ways: a) as an external attacker, b) compromise an existing
node.
22 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
In the first case, he has access only to the communication, but
not to the nodes. However, if the messages are protected through
a cryptographic suite guaranteeing integrity and confidentiality of
messages, the attacker cannot perform the external attack.
In the second case, the attacker must be su ciently equipped
in order to compromise an existing node. Once compromised a
node, the attacker has full access to the information it stores (e.g.
encryption and authentication keys). The e↵ects of this attack
could be very destructive, because the attacker can send bogus
messages, modify the existing ones or behave into an unpredictable
way. In order to protect the network from such an attack, an
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [12] can be added to the network.
The IDS can be deployed as a part of the infrastructure. It monitors
if the nodes behave as expected; if they do not, it excludes them
from the network. However, the adversary is able to control the
compromised node until the IDS does not discover it. This means
that the protection of the network depends on the e ciency of the
IDS to discover a compromised node.
1.5 Dynamic Networks
A Dynamic Network (DN) is a network paradigm where: a) nodes
change during the network lifetime, b) the number of nodes change
during the network lifetime, c) the position of nodes is known only
at runtime, d) the nodes are not homogeneous. An example of DN
is the Delay Tolerant Network (DTN), which is a network paradigm
allowing communication among nodes even in presence of network
partitions. Figure 1.2 shows an example of DTN. It is composed
of many smartphones, laptops and buses equipped with special
routers.
1.5.1 Security Requirements
Generally, a DN does not need an infrastructure, because nodes
connect each other by means of the ad-hoc mechanism. However,
in some cases the infrastructure is present in order to coordinate
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Figure 1.2: A DTN.
the nodes.
An engineer wanting to design a DN guaranteeing the secure
cooperation among nodes should take into account that it does not
require an infrastructure natively so that he should not introduce
it to the network. A well designed DN, instead, should exploit
the network features, such as upgrade the nodes capabilities. For
example, each node could be equipped with additional hardware
(e.g. TPM), allowing it to verify whether the software stack of
the other nodes has been compromised or not. Furthermore, the
software a node is equipped with could be extended with additional
algorithms and protocols (e.g. a Watchdog), allowing a node to
verify whether the other nodes behaves as expected or not.
1.5.2 Attacks E↵ects
Since in a DN the nodes change dynamically during the network
lifetime, an attacker can join the network as a standard node. This
means that he does not need an additional equipment for example
to compromise a node, because it is su cient that he has a node.
The attacker can launch both an external or internal attack.
In the first case, the network can be protected from the attack
through a cryptographic suite, guaranteeing both confidentiality
and integrity of messages. In the second case, instead, the at-
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SN DN MN
Infrastructure YES NO YES
Additional Hardware NO YES YES
Additional Software YES YES YES
External Attack
message confidentiality
message integrity
TPM IDS
Internal Attack IDS Watchdog TPM
Watchdog
Table 1.1: Comparison of challenging networks requirements and
attacks countermeasures.
tack may be destructive, because the malicious node can behave
into an unpredictable way. The best solution to this problem is to
force each node to be equipped with an additional hardware (i.e. a
TPM), which allows all the other nodes to perform a remote attes-
tation of the correctness of its software. The TPM should be able
to attest that the software has not been altered by the adversary.
Furthermore, it should also be able to perform the semantic remote
attestation [13].
Another solution to the problem could be extend each node
with an additional software (i.e. a Watchdog), which monitors
the behavior of the other nodes. If a node does not behave as
espected, the Watchdog of all the other nodes, should recognize it
and exclude it from the network.
1.6 Mixed Networks
A Mixed Network (MN) is a network paradigm where: a) some
nodes do not change during the network lifetime but other nodes
do, b) the number of nodes is not constant, c) the position of nodes
is known only at runtime, d) the nodes are not homogeneous. An
example of MN is the Publish/Subscribe Network (PSN), which is
a communication paradigm that supports dynamic, asynchronous,
many-to-many communication in a distributed system [3]. In a
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Figure 1.3: A Pub/sub network.
PSN a network of brokers is responsible for routing messages from
publishers to subscribers. In practice, they act as a dispatcher
for the network. Messages are routed based on their topics, an
information descriptor contained in the messages themselves. Sub-
scribers have to declare their interests in specific topics by issuing
subscriptions to brokers. The network of brokers does not change
during the network lifetime, while publishers and subscribers change
dynamically. Figure 1.3 shows an example of PSN. The nodes in-
side the cloud represent the network of brokers, while the other
nodes represent the publishers (P) and the subscribers (S).
1.6.1 Security Requirements
A MS is a semi-infrastructured network, in the sense that some
nodes communicate through an ad-hoc mechanism, while some
others are connected through an infrastructure. For example, in
a PSN, the brokers are connected through the ad-hoc mechanism,
but at the same time, they act as the infrastructure for the clients
of the network.
In order to guarantee the secure cooperation among nodes, a
combination of the techniques described for SNs and DNs can be
used. In practice, for nodes supported by the infrastructure, the
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mechanisms described for SNs can be exploited, while for nodes
not supported by the infrastructure, we can use the mechanisms
described for DNs. It is important to notice that the two mech-
anisms must be integrated each other in order to avoid that the
network is subjected to new vulnerabilities.
1.6.2 Attacks E↵ects
An adversary wanting to perform an attack to a MN, can act in
two di↵erent ways: a) attack the infrastructured nodes, b) attack
the ad-hoc nodes. In the first case, the attacker can perform one
of the attacks described in Section 1.4.2, while in the second case
he can perform one the attacks described in Section 1.5.2.
In the case of the PSN, if the attacker breaks the network of
brokers (i.e. performs an attack against the ad-hoc nodes), then
he has broken the infrastructure too.
1.7 Discussion
In this section we resume the previous described CNs according to
the evaluation criteria described in Section 1.3. Table 1.1 resumes
security requirements and attacks countermeasures for each family
of CN.
The SNs and MNs are infrastructured, while the DN is not.
In order to protect the network from an external attack, all the
families must provide message encryption and message integrity.
In the case of an internal attack, the best solution for a SN is to
extend the infrastructure with an IDS. For a DN the protection
against an internal attack can be achieved by equipping each node
with additional hardware (i.e. a TPM) or software (i.e. Watch-
dog). Finally, a MN can contrast an internal attack by extending
the infrastructure with an IDS and by equipping each node with
additional hardware (TPM) and software (Watchdog).
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1.8 Conclusions
In this chapter we have presented the problem of secure coopera-
tion in CNs. We have classified the CNs in three families: static,
dynamic and mixed, according to the type of nodes. We have also
shown that the requirements for guaranteeing the secure cooper-
ation change according to the nature of the CN. Furthermore we
have analyzed the e↵ects of the external and internal attacks on
the di↵erent families of CN.
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Chapter 2
Underwater Acoustic
Networks
Chi lavora con le mani e` un operaio,
chi lavora con le mani e la testa e` un artigiano,
chi lavora con le mani, la testa e il cuore e` un artista.
Francesco d’Assisi (1182–1226)
2.1 Introduction
An Underwater Acoustic Network (UAN) is a network paradigm al-
lowing communication among acoustic underwater nodes. A UAN
can be used for many purposes such as ocean sampling, environ-
ment monitoring, undersea explorations, tactical surveillance and
disaster prevention.
The communication among the underwater nodes is made pos-
sible by exploiting the acoustic modems which nodes are equipped
with. Since the acoustic channel is an open medium, an attacker
conveniently equipped could intercept the messages traversing the
network. This could be very dangerous in a tactical surveillance
network where messages must be secret. Furthermore, the attacker
could also modify or inject fake messages in the network. This
could compromise the correctness of data used for the environ-
ment monitoring. All these considerations show the urgency of
29
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protecting the underwater acoustic channel and establish a secure
channel among the underwater nodes.
The problem of secure cooperation among underwater nodes
has been investigated in [14], in which the author presents a sur-
vey of vulnerabilities and security requirements of a UAN. Aky-
ildiz et al. in [15] also present a survey on research challenges for
UANs, including security requirements. They think that the best
solution for protecting a UAN is a cross layer approach, in which
security traverses all the layers. Dong et al. in [16] make a tax-
onomy of the attacks against a UAN. They classify the attacks
into three categories: a) physical attacks against nodes, b) attacks
against the network, c) attacks against the protocols. They give
some guidelines to contrast such attacks, but they do not propose
any concrete solution. The same authors in [17, 18] propose some
mechanisms for nodes re-organizations, when one or more nodes
get destroyed. However, at the best of our knowledge, there is
not any work proposing a concrete architecture providing a secure
cooperation among underwater acoustic nodes.
In this paper we focus on the problem of secure cooperation
of a team of underwater acoustic nodes within surveillance appli-
cations and we propose an architecture guaranteeing the secure
cooperation among the nodes. The main mission goal is that of
protecting an asset (e.g. a critical infrastructure such as a power
plant placed on the shore or directly in the water) using detection
sonars mounted on each node. We assume that nodes cooperate
according to the cooperation algorithm described in [19].
In order to provide a secure communication among nodes, we
propose a cryptographic suite which takes into account the pecu-
liarities of the underwater channel. With respect to a terrestrial
network, in a UAN communication bandwidth is limited, propaga-
tion delays are very long, and underwater nodes have limited energy
resources as they are battery operated. It follows that standard
cryptographic protocols adopted for terrestrial networks must be
revisited for the underwater environment. Traditional techniques
such as ciphers, digests and digital signatures make message expand
so introducing an amount of overhead that is often comparable to
or, even, larger than the payload itself. For these reasons, we pro-
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pose the use of a cryptographic suite that protects the communica-
tion among nodes while keeping at minimum message expansion.
The cryptographic suite has been tested during real experiments
made in the sea.
We propose two architectures employing the cryptographic suite:
a) a short-medium scale system, in which all the nodes are into a
unique broadcast domain, b) a large scale system, in which many
broadcast domains exist. In the first case, the cryptographic suite
maps directly to the data link layer, while in the second case a
routing protocol is needed in order to provide multihop. As rout-
ing protocol, we use FLOOD [20], a routing protocol for UANs.
FLOOD consists in two phases: the network discovery and the
network reconfiguration. During the network discovery phase each
vehicle, fixed or mobile, discovers its neighbors and routing tables
are built, while during the network reconfiguration phase a mobile
vehicle moves. Before starting to move, a mobile node temporarily
leaves the system. While moving, a mobile node is not reachable
by the other node. When the mobile node reaches its new desti-
nation, it joins again the system. The network discovery phase is
executed only once, when the system is deployed, while the network
reconfiguration phase is executed whenever a mobile node moves.
The network discovery phase of FLOOD is subjected to the
spoofing-based Denial of Service (DoS) attack, in the sense that an
attacker can continuously trigger the discovery phase of FLOOD
and never terminate it. In this paper we extend FLOOD with
the cryptographic suite and with a mechanism acting against the
spoofing-based DoS attack. The resulting protocol is called Se-
FLOOD. In SeFLOOD, every node discovers and authenticates its
neighbors and oganizes them in a cluster by distributing them a
cluster key. Once clusters have been built, routes can be securely
established as in FLOOD. Furthermore, mobile nodes are authen-
ticated before adding to the network.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
system model, while Section 2.3 the threat model. In Sections 2.4
we describe our cryptographic suite. Section 2.5 describes the
short-medium scale. In Section 2.6 we describe the large scale
system with reference to FLOOD (Section 2.6.1) and SeFLOOD
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(Section 2.6.2). Section 2.7 describes the security analysis. Finally
in Section 2.8 we give our conclusions and future work.
2.2 System Model
We consider an underwater acoustic surveillance network aimed at
protecting a critical asset by means of a set of underwater nodes.
The main task of the network is to detect the presence of physical
underwater intruders. The research presented has been carried out
in the framework of the European project “Underwater Acoustic
Network” (UAN) [1].
From a logical point of view, we consider a system composed of
a networked set of underwater nodes, each equipped with sensing,
computing and acoustic communication facilities. Every underwa-
ter node has computational resources comparable to those of a low-
budget personal computer—e.g.,. an Intel Atom processor (also for
power saving) or a PC104 embedded standard computer—and it is
able to run a commodity operating system such as Windows XP or
Linux. However, underwater nodes are battery operated and thus
have limited energy resources.
Every node is equipped with a number of sensors that allows
it to sense both the state of surrounding sea and the presence of
a possible target in the neighbourhood. Of course, a node may
only achieve a local partial view of the system. For this reason,
a number of underwater nodes are deployed around the critical
asset and each of them reports the sensed data to a Command and
Control Center (C3) station. Such a station collects sensed data
from underwater nodes, achieves a global view of the system, and
performs an intrusion detection algorithm.
Nodes may be both fixed and mobile. Mobile underwater nodes
are unmanned and for this reason we call them autonomous un-
derwater vehicles (AUVs). AUVs are crucial components in the
surveillance system. The surveillance system strives to cover the
largest connected area. Due to the changing sea conditions, fixed
nodes alone would be hardly able to guarantee this requirement all
the time. For this reason, the system employs AUVs that dynam-
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Figure 2.1: The surveillance network.
ically change their position in order to fulfil the requirement [19].
AUVs move to locations in response to specific commands from the
C3 station. Upon reaching its target location, an AUV dynami-
cally adjusts its position according to the changed sea conditions in
order to both maintain communication connectivity with the other
AUVs and guarantee the largest connected detection area.
From the logical model, we can derive two di↵erent communica-
tion models that the surveillance system has to support. One model
is a point-to-point communication model between and underwa-
ter node and the C3. The other is a one-to-many communication
model between AUVs. Given the peculiarities of an underwater
communication system, we support these models by means of the
network architecture depicted in Figure 2.1. The gateway (GW)
is a powerful underwater acoustic node, located under the asset,
equipped both with a radio antenna, emerging from the water and
an acoustic modem. It communicates with the C3 through the ra-
dio antenna and with the underwater nodes through the acoustic
modem. In practice, the GW acts as a gateway between the C3
and the underwater nodes. Although the GW is located in the sea,
it is not energy-constrained because it is connected to the asset
through a power cable.
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Figure 2.2: The point-to-point communication model.
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Figure 2.3: The one-to-many communication model.
Figure 2.2 shows how the point-to-point communication model
is supported by the UAN network architecture. The point-to-point
communication can be of two types: a) from the node to the C3,
b) from the C3 to an AUV. In the first case (Figure 2.2 a), a node
reports sensed information or other useful information (e.g. its
position) to the C3. In order to achieve that, it sends the message
to the GW (1), which relays it to the C3 (2). In the second case
(Figure 2.2 b), the C3 sends a command to an AUV (e.g. move
from a specific location to another of the area). In order to achieve
that, the C3 sends the message to the GW (1), which relays it to
the AUV (2).
Figure 2.3 shows how the one-to-many communication model
is supported by the UAN network architecture. In order to send
a message to the other AUVs, AUVs could exploit the broadcast
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underwater acoustic medium, an thus broadcast a message with
su cient energy to reach all the AUVs, as needed. However, the
necessary power would be very large and thus AUVs would drain
their battery quickly. As the power needed to send a message de-
cays with powers greater than two of the distance [15, 21], direct
link communication between AUVs may not be the most energy
e cient solution. For this reason, we assume that when an AUV
wants to broadcast a message, it sends the message to the GW
(message 1 in the Figure 2.3), which acts as a relay for the mes-
sage and broadcasts it to the other AUVs (message 2 in the same
Figure). The GW can broadcast the message using all the power
it is necessary, because it is not resource constrained.
The above communication models can be implemented in un-
derwater environments having di↵erent geographical sizes. We con-
sider small-medium scale a system composed of a single underwater
acoustic broadcast domain, and large scale one which instead re-
quires a multi-hop network. In the former case, the logical model
of communication maps directly to the real structure of the net-
work and there is no need for a routing protocol, while in the
latter case a routing protocol is needed. In this paper we focus
on FLOOD [20], a routing protocol for underwater acoustic net-
works. FLOOD builds a tree according to the Dijkstra algorithm
with the GW as root. Then, unicast and multicast messages are
routed along the tree.
2.3 Threat Model
The described application scenario may be subjected to several
threats and attacks [5]. We assume that the adversary, equipped
with an acoustic modem, has full access to communication. Fur-
thermore we assume that when the network is deployed, it is not
compromised. However, after the network deploying, the adversary
can compromise a node.
In particular, we assume that the adversary can perform the
following attacks:
• spoofing-based attack against integrity. The adversary imper-
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sonates an existing node by injecting wrong measures, statis-
tics or wrong routing information. This could lead to the
production of wrong routing tables or wrong results, which
potentially can be dangerous,
• spoofing-based Denial of Service (DoS) attacks [22]. The ad-
versary can impersonate an existing node and compromize
the network integrity with the aim of reducing the network
availability. This attack is particularly dangerous because it
is di cult to distinguish it from the standard protocol exe-
cution,
• node compromision. The adversary can compromise a node,
accessing to all the information contained in it.
2.4 The Cryptographic Suite
In order to protect the system from the spoofing-based attack against
integrity, we organize the GW and the nodes in order to form a
secure group G. Each node ni belonging to the group shares a link
key Kig with the GW. This key is used to secure the communica-
tion between the GW and each node. Furthermore, all the nodes
and the GW share a group key Kg which is used to secure the
broadcast messages sent by the GW to all the nodes.
In the remainder of the section, we describe a cryptographic
suite providing confidentiality, authenticity of messages and a key
management protocol to distribute a new key whenever needed.
Implementing these services in a UAN is challenging due to the
severe limitations of the networking environment in terms of very
high message propagation delay, very low bandwidth, and high
energy consumption for communication. Limitation in the message
size is hence of paramount importance in order to reduce battery
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2.4.1 Confidentiality
Confidentiality of messages is achieved by encrypting messages. In
this paper we use the symmetric encryption technique. Encryption
is achieved by splitting cleartext in blocks of fixed, predefined bit-
length and encrypting each single block. In the most general case,
cleartext length is not multiple of the block length. Thus padding
is necessary. However, padding has the negative e↵ect that the ci-
phertext may result up to one block longer than the corresponding
cleartext. This e↵ect is called ciphertext expansion. While cipher-
text expansion is negligible in a traditional network, it becomes
relevant in wireless sensor networks and, in particular, underwater
acoustic networks. In these networks, communication and energy
limitations require to keep a message size small and ciphertext ex-
pansion may introduce an overhead that is not negligible anymore.
In order to completely avoid the ciphertext expansion problem, we
use the CipherText Stealing (CTS) technique that alters the pro-
cessing of the last two blocks of plaintext, resulting in a reordered
transmission of the last two blocks of ciphertext and no ciphertext
expansion [23].
2.4.2 Authenticity
Encryption without authentication is insecure [24]. For example,
an adversary may flip bits in unauthenticated ciphertext and cause
predictable changes in the plaintext that receivers are not able to
detect. To address this vulnerability, the system always authen-
ticates messages. Security of hash functions is directly related to
the length of the digest. However, as a digest is appended to the
message, it becomes another source of message expansion and con-
sequent communication overhead. UAN features a trade-o↵ be-
tween security and performance by using 4 bytes digests resulting
from truncating the real hash function value. Using such a short
hash function value is not detrimental to security [25]. An adver-
sary has 1 in 232 chances to blindly forge a digest. If an adversary
repeatedly tries to forge it, he/she needs at maximum 231 trials.
However, the adversary cannot perform trials o↵-line. This means
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Figure 2.4: Key Chain.
that the adversary has to validate a given forgery only by sending
it to an authorized receiver. This implies that the adversary has
to send 231 messages in order to successfully forge a single mali-
cious message. In a conventional network this number of trials is
not large enough. However, in a underwater acoustic network this
may provide an adequate level of security. An adversary can try
to flood the network with forgeries, but on a 500 bps channel with
184-bit messages, he/she can only send about 2.71 attempts for sec-
ond. Thus, sending 231 messages requires around 306 months, i.e.,
about 25 years. Battery-operated vehicles have not enough energy
to receive that many messages. Furthermore, the integrity attack
would translate into a denial of service attack since the adversary
needs to occupy the acoustic channel for a long time. Fortunately,
it is feasible to detect when such a attack is underway. UAN uses
a simple heuristic: vehicles could signal the base station when the
rate of digest/MAC failures exceeds some predetermined threshold.
2.4.3 Group Key Management
Each time a node leaves the system, the GW generates and dis-
tributes a new group key Kg. This is done to avoid that an old
node is able to read new messages. As to rekeying protocol, we
choose S2RP, a secure and scalable rekeying protocol for resource-
constrained devices [26]. S2RP is particularly suitable for UAN
for two reasons. First of all, S2RP provides a very e cient proof
of key authenticity. Actually, S2RP verifies the authenticity of a
key by computing a hash function. So, verification is very com-
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puting e cient and does not require any additional information,
e.g., MACs or digital signatures, which would cause message ex-
pansion. Secondly, S2RP requires a number of rekeying messages
that is logarithmic in the number of nodes so making the key dis-
tribution phase highly scalable. In short, the key authentication
mechanism levers on key-chain, a technique based on the Lamport
one-time passwords. A key-chain is a set of symmetric keys so that
each key is the hash pre-image of the previous one (see Figure 2.4).
Hence, given a key K(i) in the key-chain, anybody can compute all
the previous keys K(j), j  i, however nobody, but the key-chain
creator, can compute any of the next keys K(j), j > i. Keys are
revealed in the reversed order with respect to creation order. Given
an authenticated key in the key-chain, anybody can authenticate
the next revealed keys by simply applying an hash function. For
example, if K(i) is an authenticated key, than anyone can verify the
authenticity ofK(i+1) by verifying thatK(i) = h(K(i+1)). To reduce
the communication overhead, the GW maintains a logical key tree
(see Figure 2.5) each internal node contains a key-chain, whereas
each leaf is associated with a node and contains the node-key, i.e.,
the secret key that the node shares with GW. We call current key of
a key-chain the last revealed key of the key-chain and next key the
hash pre-image of that key. Furthermore, we denote by Ki and K
+
i
respectively the current and next key of the key-chain associated
to tree node i. Notice that Ki = h(K
+
i ). Each node maintains a
key-ring that contains every key Ki such that the sub-tree rooted
at node i contains the leaf associated with the node-key. Hence,
with reference to Figure 2.5, the key-ring of node v4 is K1, K2, K5.
As it turns out, key K1, associated to the key tree root, is shared
by all nodes and acts as the group-key. Let us now suppose that
node v4 leaves the group. All keys in its key ring are considered
compromised and KMS has to broadcast the respective next keys
K+1 , K
+
2 , K
+
5 by means of the following rekeying messages:
1. GW ! n3: EKv3 (K+5 )
2. GW ! n3: EK+5 (K
+
2 )
3. GW ! n1, n2: EK4(K+2 )
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Figure 2.5: Key Tree.
4. GW ! n1, n2, n3: EK2+ (K+1 )
5. GW ! n5, n6, n7, n8: EK3(K+1 )
Upon receiving a rekeying message, after it has been properly
decrypted, the authenticity of the next key therein contained is
verified by computing its hash and comparing the result to the
corresponding current key. For instance, upon receiving rekeying
message 5, n6 decrypts the message by means of K3 and verifies
the authenticity of K+1 by ascertaining that K1 = h(K
+
1 ). As it
turns out the rekeying protocol requires O(logNn) rekeying mes-
sages, where Nn is the number of nodes. Furthermore, given the
key-chain authentication mechanism, every rekeying message needs
to carry only the next key (in its encrypted format). No additional
information proving key authenticity is thus required. Notice that
this is a great advantage in terms of communication overhead with
respect to using digital signatures, for example. Let us suppose
that group keys are 128-bit long and we use ECC-180 digital sig-
nature to authenticate them. ECC-180 is nowadays considered as
secure as RSA-1024. In ECC-180 a digital signature is 360 bits and
thus a rekeying message would be 488bits, i.e., 3.8125 times longer
than in the approach proposed here.
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Figure 2.6: The tested scenario.
Node Distance from GW (m) Depth(m)
GW - 90.3
FN1 163.5 96
FN2 860 39
FLG1 677.8 20
FLG2 687.1 15
Table 2.1: Configuration parameters for Scenario L.
2.4.4 Experimental tests
In this section we analyze performance of our system through ex-
perimental tests. We have performed experimental tests during
the UAN experiments performed on May 2011 in Norway. For ma-
jor details about water conditions, winds, temperatures and so on,
please see [1]. Figure 2.6 shows the topology of the network which
has been tested during the experiments. There are the GW, two
fixed nodes (FN1 and FN2), but the FN1 is only a relay node.
The network is composed also of two mobile nodes (FLG1 and
FLG2). As mobile nodes, we have used the Folaga, deployed by
GraalTech [27].
Tables 2.1 shows the configuration parameters. The GW is
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Figure 2.7: Average Delivery Ratio with security and without se-
curity.
placed at a depth of 96m, while FN1 and FN2 at a depth of 96m
and 39m, respectively, with a distance from the GW of 163.5m
and 860m respectively. The nodes FLG1 and FLG2 are placed at
a depth of 20m and 15m respectively, with an initial position of
677.8m and 687.1m far from the GW, respectively.
We have measured the Average Delivery Ratio (ADR), in order
to verify whether the nodes are still able to communicate even
in presence of the overhead added by security. The ADR is the
average ratio between the number of received messages and the
number of sent messages, both calculated at the application layer.
In practice, it measures the fraction of messages the network is
able to deliver. Ideally the delivery ratio should be equal to 1. The
ADR has been tested with the cryptographic suite enabled (C-ON)
and disabled (C-OFF).
Figure 2.7 shows the ADR of nodes FN2 and FLG2. The other
nodes are not shown because of lack of data. We note that the
ADR without security is greater than that with security in both
nodes. We can explain this in the following way. Each message is
associated a CRC, which is calculated at the data link layer. When
the CRC verification fails, the message is dropped. Furthermore,
when the message size increases, also the packet loss for that mes-
sage increases so that the probability that the message is corrupted
and dropped increases. When the security is enabled, the message
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size is increased of 4 bytes (due to the digest appended to the mes-
sage) with respect to the message without security. This causes
the ADR increase when the security is enabled.
2.5 Small-medium scale system
The small-medium scale system is given when all the nodes fall
into a unique broadcast domain. In this case a routing layer is
not needed so that the logical models described in section 2.2 can
be mapped directly to the data link layer. Both the GW and the
nodes can send their messages by exploiting the broadcast acoustic
channel. Since the messages sent from a node to the GW should
be unicast, but the medium is broadcast, we protect such messages
through the cryptographic suite described in section 2.4.
2.6 Large Scale System
The large scale system is given when all the nodes do not fall into
a unique broadcast domain so that a multihop network is needed.
As routing protocol we use FLOOD [20]. FLOOD has the advan-
tage that has been developed and tested in a real UAN. However,
it does not provide any mechanism to protect messages from the
attacks described in section 2.3. For this reason, we extend it with
the cryptographic suite described in section 2.4. In practice, each
message exchanged to build routing tables or containing data is en-
crypted and authenticated through the cryptographic suite. The
resulting protocol is called SeFLOOD.
In its original version, the FLOOD protocol does not support
the broadcast communication. In order to support the key distri-
bution, we map the S2RP protocol to FLOOD by using the relay
mechanism: each message is sent only once on a given communica-
tion link. Assume that we have a network with the topology shown
in Figure 2.8 and the key three for this topology is that shown in
Figure 2.5. Furthermore, assume that the node n4 leaves the net-
work. In this case the keys K1, K2 and K5 must be renewed. The
key K1 must be sent to all the nodes. The GW sends it to n1
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Figure 2.8: An example of topology.
and n5. Then n1 and n5 relay it to n2 and n6 and n7 respectively.
Finally, n2 and n7 relay it to n3 and n8, respectively. The key K2
must be sent to n1, n2 and n3, while the key K5 must be sent only
to n3. As the messages containing the keys K2 and K5 must follow
the same path, they can be aggregated so that the GW sends the
aggregated message to n1, which relays it to n2, which relays it to
n3.
The relay mechanism can be used also when a node wants to
broadcast a message to the other nodes (one-to-many communica-
tion model). It firstly sends it to the GW, which relays it to the
other nodes. The point-to-point communication model, instead,
can exploit the sandard unicast routing mechanism supported by
FLOOD.
In the remainder of the section we describe firstly FLOOD,
then SeFLOOD and finally we compare them through simulation
performance analysis.
2.6.1 FLOOD
During the network discovery phase, the FLOOD protocol is based
on the flooding principle. The protocol relies on the idea that a
node broadcasts a received message until it receives the same mes-
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sage it has sent. Figure 2.9 shows an execution instance of the
FLOOD protocol. Suppose that the network is composed of three
nodes. Furthermore, suppose that the transmission range of the
GW (n1) covers only the node n2, but the node n2 is able to reach
both n1 and n3. Node n3 is able to reach only n2. The protocol is
initiated by the GW which broadcasts a HELLO(n1), including its
identifier and the time ti at which the message is sent. Upon receiv-
ing the hello message, the node n2 adds to the message its identifier
and other information, including the quality of the link (e.g. sig-
nal attenuation). Then n2 relays the messasge HELLO(n1,n2) by
broadcasting it after a randomized delay. When n1 receives the
message, it re-broadcasts it. When n2 receives the new message, it
sends to n1 a REPORT(n1,n2) unicast message. The GW acknowl-
edges n2 by sending it a ACK(n1,n2) unicast message. With the ack
message, the protocol between n1 and n2 is completed. However,
also the node n3 receives the HELLO(n1,n2) message. Suppose that
n3 receives it after that n2 receives ACK(n1,n2). The node n3 adds
to the message its identifier and information about link quality.
Then it broadcasts HELLO(n1,n2,n3). Upon receiving this message,
the node n2 re-broadcasts it. The message is received both by the
GW n1 and the node n3. Upon receiving the message, the node
n3 builds a report message REPORT(n1,n2,n3). When n2 receives
the report message from n3, it sends it the ACK(n1,n2,n3) unicast
message so that the protocol between n2 and n3 is complete. When
the GW receives the message HELLO(n1,n2,n3) it re-broadcasts it.
Upon receiving the message the node n2 builds a report message
REPORT(n1,n2,n3). When n1 receives the report message from n2,
it sends it the ACK(n1,n2,n3) unicast message so that the protocol
between n1 and n2 is complete.
Network Reconfiguration
When the network discovery phase is completed, FLOOD allows
the network to dynamically reconfigure. In order to support the
network reconfiguration phase, it makes the following assumptions:
a) each mobile node knows when it is going to move and when it has
reached its new location; b) each mobile node does not send/receive
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Figure 2.9: The FLOOD protocol.
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Figure 2.10: A DoS attack.
messages while moving.
Before starting to move, a mobile node nm sends a DEL(nm)
message to the GW in order to be removed from the routing tables.
Upon receiving the message, the GW updates routing tables by
considering only the remaining nodes. Then the GW sends a BEST
message to each node for which the routing table is changed. The
BEST message is unicast. The message includes also information
about the new next hop to reach the GW.
Assume now that the mobile node has reached its new loca-
tion so that it broadcasts an ADD(nm) message. Upon receiving
the ADD(nm) message, each node sends back it a ADD-ACK mes-
sage containing information about link quality. The mobile node
acknowledges all the received ADD-ACK messages by sending back
unicast ADD-ACK messages, containing information about link qual-
ity. Finally, the mobile node sends an ADD-REPORT message to the
GW so that the GW can update the routing table and distribute
to all the interested nodes the new table by sending a ADD-BEST
message.
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The spoofing-based DoS attack
The FLOOD protocol is subjected to the spoofing-based DoS at-
tack. Figure 2.10 shows an example of how an attacker can perform
a spoofing-based DoS attack in a network composed of three nodes.
Whenever the attacker receives a HELLO message, it can add a new
fake node and broadcast the message to the other vechicles. In this
way the protocol never completes. In order to avoid this kind of
attack, each node could be deployed with the list of all the nodes
identifiers belonging to the system. Thus, if the attacker tries to
add a new fake node to the network, each node rejects it, because
the fake node is not contained in that list. However, due to the
underwater conditions and to the high distances among nodes, it
may happen that a node n1 is not able to directly contact nodes
n2 and n3 belonging to the system. The attacker could exploit this
situation in order to use n2 and n3 identifier to perform a DoS
attack.
2.6.2 SeFLOOD
In order to protect the FLOOD protocol from the threats described
in section 3.3.1, we have extended it with the cryptographic suite
described in section 2.4. The resulting protocol, SeFLOOD, en-
crypts and authenticates all the messages by using the crypto-
graphic suite. Furthermore, SeFLOOD extends FLOOD with a
mechanism contrasting the DoS attack. This mechanism is based
on the Cluster Key Distribution Protocol (CKDP).
In order to improve security, we organize nodes in clusters, such
that if an adversary compromises a node, he is able to compromize
only the cluster which the node belongs to and not all the network.
Each cluster is associated to a Cluster Key, which is used to secure
communication among nodes belonging to the same cluster. As the
number of nodes in the network is low, all the nodes could be pre-
deployed with all the possible Cluster Keys. This will be discussed
later in the paper. In the reminder of the section, we firstly describe
the CKDP, which dynamically distributes a Cluster Key only to
nodes belonging to that cluster. Then we describe a particular
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application scenario where the Cluster Keys can be predeployed in
the nodes.
The Cluster Key Distribution Protocol
We consider the network as connected graph G = (V , E) with ver-
texes V representing nodes and edges E their connections. Each
connection has a cost C, given by the channel quality (e.g. signal
attenuation). We assume that each pair of nodes (ni, nj), i 6= j
in the network shares a key, called Link Key Kij, which is used
to protect unicast messages between ni and nj. In order to dis-
tribute the link keys, a well known key agreement protocol can
be used such as Elliptic curve Di e-Hellman [28] or the Blundo
scheme [29]. However, for simplicity, each node can be deployed
with a table, called Link Key Table (LKT), containing all its Link
Keys. This solution is indicated for a UAN because the number
of nodes is low and each node has enough memory to store all the
LKT. For example, with a Link Key of 128 bits and a network of
1024 nodes, the LKT is 16 Kbytes. If we consider that a node is
equipped with a memory of 2 GBytes, for a network of 1024 nodes,
the LKT wastes only 0.78% of memory.
We split the graph G into N subgraphs G1,G2, ..GN such that
each subgraph Gn, 0  n  N constitutes a cluster. A cluster
is made of a subset of nodes contained into a unique broadcast
domain.
In order to securely and e ciently broadcast messages into a
cluster, each node ni generates a Cluster Key Ki and distributes
it to all the members of its cluster. Thus each node maintains a
Cluster Key for each node of the cluster. The Cluster Key Table
(CKT) of node ni stores all the Cluster Keys of the members of
the cluster which ni belongs to. In general, the number of entries
of the CKT is less than the number of entries of the LKT. However
if all the nodes fall into a unique broadcast domain, the number of
entries in CKT is equal to that of LKT. This means that also the
memory wasted by CKT is negligible.
In order to distribute all the Cluster Keys, the following Cluster
Key Distribution protocol is executed:
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Figure 2.11: The CKDP applied to FLOOD.
1. ni ! ⇤ : ni, Ti
2. nj ! ni : nj, EKij(Kj, Ti)
The protocol is composed of two phases, the discovery phase (1)
and the key distribution phase (2). During the discovery phase each
node ni generates a fresh quantity Ti and broadcasts it together
with its identifier ni. Upon receiving the message (1), each node
nj sends ni its cluster keyKj, its identifier nj and the fresh quantity
nj, all encrypted with the key Kij (2). Upon receiving the message
from nj, the node ni verifies its freshness and stores the received
cluster key Kj.
The CKDP is executed before FLOOD, in order to allow only
authorized nodes to trigger the FLOOD protocol. In fact, an ad-
versary performing the DoS attack can only replay the first message
of the protocol, but he cannot trigger all the FLOOD protocol.
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Figure 2.11 shows an instance of CKDP. Assume that the net-
work is composed of three nodes, the GW n1 and the nodes n2 and
n3. Furthermore, suppose that the transmission range of n1 covers
only the node n2, but the node n2 is able to reach both n1 and n3.
node n3 is able to reach only n2. Each node broadcasts its identi-
fier and a fresh quantity. As the medium access is CSMA like, a
single node per time can transmit. Assume that at the beginning
the node n1 broadcasts the message [n1, T1]. Upon receiving the
message, the node n2 encrypts its cluster key K2 and the received
T1 with the link key K12. Then n2 appends to the message its iden-
tifier n2 and sends the message back to n1. As the medium is not
busy, the node n2 now can broadcast the message [n2, T2]. Both
n1 and n3 receive it so that they can encrypt their cluster keys,
K1 and K3 respectively and the fresh quantity T2, received from
n2 with the link ley K12 and K13 respectively. Finally they send
the message back to n2, specifying also their identifier. Eventually,
n3 broadcasts the message [n3, T3]. Upon receiving it, n2 encrypts
the fresh quantity T3 and cluster key K2, with the link key K23,
and sends the message back to n3. At the end of the protocol three
clusters are built, C1 = (n1, n2), C2 = (n1, n2, n3), C3 = (n2, n3)
with cluster keys K1, K2 and K3, respectively.
Secure Network Reconfiguration
SeFLOOD supports also mobile nodes, without adding overhead in
terms of number of messages. In fact it exploits FLOOD messages
sent by a mobile node in order to distribute the cluster keys. We
assume that nodes have loosely synchronized clocks. This hypotesis
is reasonable because the system is centralized so that the master
can periodically send a synchronization messages to all the nodes
of the network.
Assume that nm is a mobile node. If nm wants to delete from
the network, it triggers the following protocol:
1. nm ! GW : DEL, nm, Tm, Egm(Tm, nm)
2. GW ! ni: BEST, Egi(Tg, nm)
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Firstly, nm generates a fresh quantity Tm and encrypts it and its
identifier nm with the Link Key Kgm. Then it sends the GW the
message (1), containing the previous authenticated Tm, its identi-
fier nm and the request to be deleted from the network (DEL). Upon
receiving the message (1), the GW , deletes nm from the routing
tables, updates the routing tables, generates a fresh quantity Tg
and informs every node ni which the routing table must be up-
dated for, by sending it the unicast message (2). The message (2)
contains the FLOOD BEST message, the identifier of node nm and
the fresh quantity Tg, both encrypted with the link key Kgi, shared
by the GW and ni. Upon receiving the message (2), each node ni
updates its routing table.
Assume now that the mobile node nm wants to add again the
network. The node nm triggers the following protocol:
1. nm ! ⇤: ADD, nm, Tm
2. ni ! nm: ADD-ACK, Eim(Tm, Ti, Ki)
3. nm ! ni: ADD-ACK, Eim(Ti, Km)
4. nm ! GW : ADD-REPORT, {E1m(|| < ni, Ti > 8ni 2 Cm)}
5. GW ! ni: ADD-BEST Egi(Ti)
At the beginning, the mobile node nm generates a fresh quantity
Tm and broadcasts the ADD message appending the fresh quantity
Tm to it (1). Upon receiving the message (1), every node ni gen-
erates a fresh quantity Ti and appends to the ADD-ACK message
its cluster key Ki, the fresh quantity Ti and the received Tm, all
encrypted with the link key Kim. Finally it sends the obtaneid
message to nm (2). When nm receives the message (2) from the
node ni, it appends to the ADD-ACK message its cluster key Km
and Ti, all encryptedwith the link key Kim. Finally it sends the
message to the node ni (3). The node nm sends the message (3)
to every node ni which it received the message (2) from. Eventu-
ally nm appends to the ADD-REPORT message all the received fresh
quantities Ti. The symbol || indicates the append operation. In
practice, nm sends to the GW the list of all the fresh quantities Ti
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and the nodes ni which it received the message (2), i.e. the nodes
belonging to its cluster Cm. Before sending the message (4), nm
encrypts all the couples < ni, Ti > with the link key Kgm.
Key Refreshing
Each node ni shares with the GW a key, called Private Key Pi,
which is used by the GW to authenticate specific messages sent
from the GW to ni. In particular, whenever the GW detects a
compromised node nc, it informs all the nodes having nc in their
cluster to refresh their Cluster Key and distribute it to all the nodes
of the cluster, except for nc. The GW sends to the interested nodes
the following unicast REFRESH message:
• GW ! ni: EPj(REFRESH, nc), REFRESH, nc
where nc indicates the node to be excluded from the next key
distribution. Once received the REFRESH message, each node ni
triggers again the key distribution phase of the CKDP, excluding
the node nc.
This Key Refreshing mechanism allows a compromised node to
perform attacks only until a new cluster key is distributed. The
time it can remain active in the network depends on the capability
of the IDS to detect quickly an adversary. However, once detected,
the adversary can be easily excluded from the cluster and more in
general from the network.
Key Predeployment
In the Section 2.6.2 we have described the CKDP, which allows
each node to distribute its Cluster Key to the other nodes belong-
ing to its cluster. However, sometimes, it may happen that when
the network is deployed, each node is initially located into a well
known position so that it knows in advance its potential neighbors.
A potential neighbor i for node j is a node which is located in the
transmission range of j, but it could be not acoustically reachable
by j because of the sea conditions. This means that i and j become
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e↵ective neighbors only if the conditions of the sea (e.g. tempera-
ture, salinity) allow the acoustic communication between the two
nodes.
If a node knows in advance its potential neighbors, the first
phase of the CKDP (i.e. the discovery phase) can be completely
avoided, because a node can assume as neighbors its ppotential
neighbors. However, during the key distribution phase, the node
is able to recognize its e↵ective neighbors.
Note that the assumption that each node can know in advance
its potential neighbors cannot be applied into Wireless Sensor Net-
works (WSNs), because, due to the high number of nodes, nodes
are randomly deployed in the area. In a UAN, instead, the number
of the nodes is low and they can be deployed into a well known
position.
2.6.3 Performance evaluation
In order to test how much overhead the security adds to FLOOD,
we have compared SeFLOOD with FLOOD by using the SimPy
simulator [30]. We have used realistic results obtained during some
experimental tests done in sea [1]. They showed that the average
Round Trip Time of the network was about 19 sec., while the max-
imum transmission rate of the acoustic modems was 500 bits/sec.
We have considered a network composed of 7 fixed nodes, the
GW and 1 mobile node. We have split the simulation duration in
two phases: the network discovery phase, which is executed when
the simulation starts, and the reconfiguration phase, during which
the mobile node moves from a point to another of the network. In
particular, firstly it deletes from the network and then adds again
to it.
We have simulated two scenarios aimed at studying the perfor-
mance with di↵erent topologies: a Sparse Scenario and a Dense
Scenario. Figure 2.12 shows Sparse Scenario and Dense Scenario
respectively. In the Sparse Scenario each fixed node is able to com-
municate with 2 neighbors, while in the Dense Scenario each node
is able to communicate with 5 neighbors.
For each simulation, we have made 15 runs, each lasting 5000
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Figure 2.12:
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Parameter Value
Duration 5000 sec.
Number of runs 15
Average transmission range 2 Km
Maximum transmission power 189 dB re µPa
Depth 200 m
Number of nodes 9
Sparse Scenario Dense Scenario
Average number of Neighbors 2 5
Table 2.2: Simulation parameters.
sec. We have fixed the transmission range of each node to 2 Km
and each node works at a depth of 200 m in the water. Each node
is able to transmit a bit with a maximum transmission power of
189 dB re µPa. Table 2.2 resumes the simulation parameters.
We have evaluated the performance of SeFLOOD with respect
to two metrics: a) number of messages b) number of bits. Each
metric %M is calculated as the percentage increase of SeFLOOD
with respect to FLOOD, by using the following formula:
%M =
MS  MF
MF
⇥ 100 (2.1)
where MS represents the metric calculated using the SeFLOOD
protocol, while MF represents the same metric calculated using
the FLOOD protocol.
Number of Messages and Bits Metrics measure how much over-
head SeFLOOD adds to FLOOD in terms of total number of sent
messages and bits, respectively. Number of Messages metrics mea-
sure the number of messages sent in the network. Number of Bits
metrics instead measure the e↵ective number of bits sent in the
network. Thus even though the number of bits is higher in Se-
FLOOD than in FLOOD, it may happen that the total number
of messages sent in the network is quite similar in SeFLOOD and
FLOOD.
Number of Messages metrics include the Discovery Messages,
the Add Messages and the Delete Messages. They measure the
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percentage increase in terms of number of messages introduced by
SeFLOOD with respect to FLOOD during the discovery phase, the
add phase and the delete phase, respectively.
Bits metrics include the Discovery Bits, the Add Bits and the
Delete Bits. They measure the percentage increase in terms of
bits introduced by SeFLOOD with respect to FLOOD during the
discovery phase, the add phase and the delete phase, respectively.
Figure 2.13 shows the Discovery Messages in Dense and Sparse
scenarios. The Figure does not show the Add Messages and Delete
Messages, as the number of sent messages by SeFLOOD during the
add and delete phase is equal to that of FLOOD during the same
phases. Figure 2.14 shows the Discovery Bits, the Add Bits and
the Delete Bits in Dense and Sparse scenarios.
With respect to the Discovery Messages and Bits, we note that
the gap between SeFLOOD and FLOOD is given by the messages
sent by the Cluster Key Distribution Protocol. The percentage
increase introduced by SeFLOOD in terms of Discovery Messages
is very high (about 200% in Sparse Scenario and about 300% in
Dense Scenario). However, each message is very short so that the
overhead added by SeFLOOD in terms of number of bits, during
the discovery phase is about 4% in Sparse Scenario and about 6%
in Dense Scenario. This is due to the fact that FLOOD messages
include information about link quality so that they are very big.
SeFLOOD, instead, sends only few information, i.e. node identi-
fiers, timestamps and keys.
With respect to the Add and Delete Messages, as already said,
SeFLOOD does not add any overhead, because it exploits FLOOD
messages. However it adds a little overhead in terms of Add Bits
and Delete Bits (1% in the worst case), as Figure 2.14 shows.
2.7 Security Analysis
In this section we analyze the security of our system in terms of
the attacks described in the Section 2.3.
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2.7.1 Spoofing-based attack against integrity
The spoofing-based attack against integrity is an external attack
in which the adversary does not compromise a node. The crypto-
graphic suite, described in Section 2.4, allows the system to pro-
tect the communications from such attacks. In fact, the messages
exchanged by nodes are encrypted through symmetric cryptogra-
phy and authenticated through a MAC. Therefore, if the adver-
sary wants to read the message, he must know the keys used for
encryption/decryption or he must perform an attack against the
encryption algorithm. Furthermore, if he alters the message, the
MAC becomes inconsistent so that the message is discarded.
2.7.2 Spoofing-based Denial of Service (DoS)
attack
We analyze this attack only with respect to SeFLOOD. SeFLOOD
provides a mechanism to reduce the spoofing-based DoS attack
which an adversary can make to FLOOD. As the CKDP is executed
before FLOOD, only authenticated nodes can partecipate to the
FLOOD discovery phase. This means that the adversary can send
only the first message of the CKDP, but he cannot perform the
attack described in Section 2.6.1.
2.7.3 Node compromision
Assume that an adversary captures a node ni and accesses all the
information which it stores. In particular, the adversary can: a) ac-
cess the keys, b) send messages in the network, c) receive messages
from other nodes.
However, as soon as the IDS detects the node ni compromision,
it informs the GW. In the case of the small-medium scale system,
the GW simply triggers the S2RP protocol, in order to distribute
a new group key Kg. In the case of the large scale system, instead,
the GW performs the following two operations: a) firstly it triggers
the key refreshing mechanism described in Section 2.6.2 in order
to distribute the new cluster keys, b) then it triggers the S2RP
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protocol in order to distribute a new group key Kg.
Anyway, the system remains subjected to an adversary attack
during the time employed by the IDS to detect it plus the time
needed to distribute the new keys.
2.8 Conclusions
In this chapter we have described a cryptographic suite aimed at
protecting the communication among a set of underwater nodes.
We have employed this cryptographic suite in two architectures:
the small-medium scale system and the large scale system. We
have shown through real experiments made in the sea that the
cryptographic suite adds a minimum overhead to the system in
both the architectures. At the state of the art, this is the first
work describing a solution to the problem of secure cooperation
among underwater nodes.
Chapter 3
Delay Tolerant Networks
Quello che si spera si deve credere che possa essere
ottenuto; e` quanto aggiunge la speranza al puro
desiderio.
Tommaso d’Aquino (1225–1274)
3.1 Introduction
A Delay Tolerant Network (DTN) is a network paradigm where
connectivity among mobile nodes is not always guaranteed. In or-
der to guarantee messages delivery even in presence of network par-
titions, a DTN defines specific routing mechanisms to forward mes-
sages. The most common are epidemic-based [31] and probability-
based [32, 33]. In the epidemic-based mechanisms, many replicas
of the same message are transmitted in the hope that at least one
reaches the receiver. This mechanism is very expensive in terms of
employed resources and it is not applicable when the nodes have
limited resources (e.g., mobile nodes when they are battery oper-
ated). In the probability-based mechanism, the sender forwards the
message to the node having the highest probability of successful
message delivery. This mechanism relies on the implicit assump-
tion that all the nodes cooperate to message forwarding. Unfortu-
nately, malicious nodes may misbehave and act against the routing
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mechanism in di↵erent ways [34,35]. In this chapter we deal with a
specific malicious misbehaviour according to which malicious nodes
called sinkholes send wrong routing information to attract the as
largest number of messages as possible. This sinkhole attack may
be preparatory to other kinds of attacks, such as dropping all the
attracted messages or dropping only some of them. In the former
case the sinkhole acts as a blackhole, whereas in the latter as a
selective forwarder [36].
In this chapter we face with the problem of reducing the impact
of the presence of blackholes in a DTN and propose an approach
based on the concept of reputation. In short, upon selecting the
next forwarding node, i.e., the node to forward a message to, a
node estimates how well a candidate forwarding node has behaved
on the basis of past interactions with that possible forwarding node.
We call reputation such an estimation. In practice the reputation
measures the trustworthiness of a node. The lower the reputation
of a node, the higher the chance that the node is blackhole. The
chances of selecting a node as a forwarding node are weighted by
means of its reputation. Therefore a node having a low reputation
is unlikely chosen as a forwarding node.
In our approach every node maintains a local notion of repu-
tation. We make this choice in order to avoid the overhead and
the technical complications related to maintaining a global shared
notion of reputation [37]. Intuitively, reputation is maintained by
means of three mechanisms, namely acknowledgments, nodes list
and aging. Every message carries the list of forwarding nodes the
message has traversed. Upon receiving the message, every node
can update the reputation of the forwarding nodes specified in the
list. Furthermore, upon handing a message to a forwarding node,
the sender starts waiting for an acknowledgment from the ultimate
destination. If the acknowledgement arrives, the sender increases
the reputation of that forwarding node. Finally, reputations are pe-
riodically aged, i.e, decreased. The challenge here is to adapt the
aging period to the highly changing delays of a DTN. We succeed
in this by using a properly designed Kalman filter [38].
The reputation management mechanism employs both data mes-
sages and acknowledgment messages. In particular, the format of
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data messages has been extended to accommodate additional in-
formation concerning reputation management while an acknowl-
edgment message is a unicast short message. It follows that, di↵er-
ently from other systems [39,40], the proposed reputation manage-
ment protocol does not need to resort to communication expensive
mechanisms for reputation updates dissemination based on broad-
cast/multicast communication.
In this chapter we apply the reputation-based approach to the
Context Aware Routing (CAR) protocol, a probability-based rout-
ing protocol previously defined in [32]. CAR has no protection
mechanisms against blackholes. We show that by augmenting CAR
by means of the proposed reputation mechanism, the delivery ratio
increases from 20% up to 60% according to the considered scenario.
We call Reputation-based CAR (RCAR) the resulting proto-
col. An early version of RCAR has been already proposed in [41].
With respect to that version, here we propose the following en-
hancements: a) we protect the integrity of the reputation man-
agement information carried by messages; b) we add a mechanism
to dynamically determine the reputation aging period; c) we com-
pare the performance of RCAR with that of T-ProPHET from
several viewpoints including delivery ratio, attraction ratio, and
delivery delay. T-ProPHET is another reputation-based protocol
for DTN [39] that we have chosen for comparison with RCAR be-
cause it is both quite recent and the most similar to RCAR. Perfor-
mance evaluation tests show that in the best case RCAR is able to
reach a delivery ratio of about 80% while T-ProPHET in the best
case reaches a delivery ratio of about 70%. Furthermore RCAR
works better than T-ProPHET when the number of blackholes in
the network is low. In any case, RCAR is more e↵ective than than
T-ProPHET, that is, the improvement that RCAR makes to CAR
always outperforms the improvement that T-ProPHET makes to
ProPHET.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes re-
lated work. Section 3.3 describes the network assumptions whereas
Section 3.4 describes RCAR. Section 3.5 reports performance eval-
uation by means of simulation. Finally, Section 3.6 describes our
conclusions and future work.
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3.2 Related Work
The issue of secure cooperation in DTNs is a recent challenge.
Notwithstanding a lot of work exists on this field, addressing dif-
ferent aspects of secure cooperation [34, 35]. The most common
threats to DTNs are: selfish nodes and blackhole nodes. A selfish
node is a node which is reluctant to cooperate in message forward-
ing, in order to save its own energy. At the state of art, the most
important protocols acting against selfish nodes try to reduce the
selfishness by incentiving the selfish nodes to cooperate [42–44].
A blackhole is a node which drops all the received messages.
At the state of art, the most important protocols acting against
blackholes can be classified as : a) reputation-based, b) reference-
based, and, finally, c) replication-based. In reputation-based sys-
tems [37, 39], each node observes the behavior of other nodes and
assigns each of them a reputation, which measures how much a
node is well behaving. The routing of messages is done on the
basis of the reputation: the lower the reputation the lower the
probability that a node is chosen as next hop (forwarding node)
for a message.
In reference-based systems [45–47], each node wanting to for-
ward a packet gives its references to its neighbors. A reference is
a piece of evidence specifying that a node has cooperated to mes-
sage forwarding. On the basis of references of a given node j, a
node i can decide whether to forward its messages to j or not. In
replication-based systems [40,48], secure cooperation is achieved by
sending many replicas of the same message.
In the Secure Reputation-based DynamicWindow Scheme (SReD)
[37], messages are forwarded to nodes having the highest reputa-
tion. The basic idea of SReD is to provide recommendations to
each node based on the opinions of the other nodes. In practice, if
a node a wants to calculate the reputation of a node b, it asks its
adjacent nodes to give it their opinion on b, except node b. Then,
a calculates the reputation for b as the sum of its local opinion on
b and that given by other nodes. In SReD reputations are shared
among all nodes. The SReD protocol relies on the strong assump-
tion that every node has a trusted hardware. In fact, if there is not
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a trusted hardware, a node could send to the other nodes bogus
recommendations. With respect to SReD, we propose a protocol
in which the reputation is a local notion so that there is not the
need of a trusted hardware.
In [39], the authors describe T-ProPHET, a reputation assisted
data forwarding mechanism for opportunistic networks. Each node
sends its messages to the node having the higher reputation. Upon
receiving a message, a destination builds a Positive Feedback Mes-
sage (PFM), which contains information useful to update the rep-
utation of the carriers. The PFM is sent through epidemic routing,
in order to reach more quickly the sender. When the sender receives
the PFM, it can update the reputations of the carriers contained
in it. The epidemic routing mechanism allows a sender to update
reputations quickly, but it also adds tra c overhead. An extensive
comparison with T-ProPHET is reported in Section 3.5.
Y. Ren et al. propose a mechanism to detect blackhole nodes
based on packet exchange recording [46]. When two nodes meet,
they exchange their respective history records, containing the list
of all node they have encountered. All the history records are au-
thenticated through digital signatures. Comparing the other node’s
history with its own local history, each node is able to determine
whether the other node has forwarded all the messages or not. This
mechanism is called sanity check. If a node has not forwarded all
the messages, the other nodes can detect it and classify that node
as a blackhole. This mechanism is able to recognize a high number
of blackhole nodes. However, this technique is not indicated when
contact time between two nodes is short, because there may be no
time to exchange long histories.
The same authors propose an improvement of the previous tech-
nique [47]. Instead of having every node to perform the sanity
check, there is a single ferry node that performs it. Periodically, the
ferry node visits all the nodes and asks them their history records.
The ferry node classifies a node as a blackhole if the history of that
node contains messages that the other nodes’ histories do not con-
tain. While this technique is very e cient, the ferry node features
a single point of failure. If an adversary is able to compromise of
knock down the ferry node, all the system is compromised.
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M. Chuah et al. propose a dynamic replication mechanism,
where the number of generated message copies, called redundant
factor, is calculated dynamically, on the basis of the current de-
livery ratio [40]. In particular, given a tra c flow originating in a
sender and ending in a destination, this latter node measures the
delivery ratio for the flow and sends it to the sender. The sender
dynamically adjusts the redundancy factor according to the re-
ceived delivery ratio. The main drawback of this protocol consists
in the large number of messages caused by replication.
3.3 System Model
We consider a Delay Tolerant Network (DTN) composed of several
wireless nodes moving inside a fixed area. For instance, a node may
be a device held by a human or embedded in a bus. In the net-
work, messages are forwarded according to the following strategy.
If a route already exists between the sender s and the receiver r, the
message is forwarded using a standard routing protocol for ad hoc
networks (e.g. DSDV). We call synchronous routing this mecha-
nism. If the route does not exist, the sender uses an asynchronous
routing mechanism according to which the message is forwarded
to the forwarding node c having the highest chance of successful
message delivery. The node c stores the message in its local bu↵er
until it either establishes a route with the receiver r or encounters
another forwarding node c0 having a higher chance of message de-
livery to the destination. In the former case, c delivers the message
to r by means of the synchronous routing. In the latter case, c ap-
plies again the the asynchronous routing and forwards the message
to c0. This routing process continues until the message eventually
reaches its final destination r. Notice that a bu↵er has a limited
size, therefore, when it gets full, the arrival of a new message causes
a message loss. DTN mechanism inherently loses messages, unless
the bu↵er size is unlimited. DTN management systems di↵er on
bu↵er management and message replacement policies [49].
A crucial issue in asynchronous routing is how to select for-
warding nodes [2]. Many solutions have been proposed [33,50,51].
3.3. SYSTEM MODEL 67
In this work we refer to the selection algorithm proposed by CAR
(Context Aware Routing) [32]. In CAR, each node calculates its
own delivery probability , i.e., the chance of successful message de-
livery on the basis of its own context information. A node con-
text is defined as the set of attributes that describe the aspects
of the system that can be used to drive the process of message
delivery (e.g., mobility of node or battery level). Each node esti-
mates its own delivery probability by means of a Utility Function
U(x1, x2, ..., xn) =
Pn
i=1wiUi(xi) where xi represents an attribute,
Ui(xi) the utility function calculated over xi, and wi is the signifi-
cance weight reflecting the relative importance of each attribute.
A node periodically computes an estimation of its own delivery
probability and then broadcasts it, together with the routing infor-
mation necessary to build routing tables (for synchronous routing),
to the other nodes which it is able to reach through the synchronous
routing. CAR employs DSDV as synchronous routing protocol. In
CAR a node selects the forwarding node c among those reachable
through the synchronous routing as that having the highest chance
of message delivery, i.e., the node having the greatest value of Uc.
3.3.1 Adversary Model
A DTN could be a↵ected by many threats [4, 48]. In this chapter
we assume that a node under the adversary control may behave as
a blackhole [36]. This means that the malicious node strives to ap-
pear attractive for the other nodes as far as the routing algorithm
is concerned. Then, upon receiving messages to forward—both
synchronously or asynchronously—the blackhole drops them. In
order to surreptitiously increase its own attractiveness, a black-
hole may act in two ways. Either by modifying in transit routing
information. Alternatively, a blackhole b may exploit the CAR
mechanism for forwarding node selection and surreptitiously dis-
seminate a falsely high value of the utility function, i.e., U ! 1, so
inducing other nodes to select it with high probability. We assume
that blackholes do not collude.
Incidentally, we would like to point out that the behaviour of a
selfish node [36]—a node which uses the routing service but which
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does not want to spend its own resources to cooperate towards
that service—is largely opposite to a blackhole’s one. Actually, in
contrast to blackholes, selfish nodes strive to appear unattractive
for the other nodes in order to be not selected as a forwarding
nodes. However, if selected, they will forward messages. In the
CAR context, a selfish node will likely broadcast small fake values
of its utility functions, i.e., U ! 0. It follows that countermeasures
against selfish nodes tend to be very di↵erent from those of black-
holes. In this chapter we will not address selfish nodes and do not
mention them any further. Countermeasures against them will be
the subject of future work.
3.4 RCAR
In this section we describe RCAR (Reputation-based CAR), an
extension of CAR that is based on the concept of reputation and
able to limit the e↵ect of the presence of blackholes.
In Section 3.4.1 we introduce the concept of reputation in CAR.
Then in Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3, we give some intuitions about its
implementation and how nodes reputation gets updated.
3.4.1 The concept of Reputation
Every node estimates how well another nodes behaves regarding the
forwarding of messages. We call reputation (R) such an estimation.
The range of R is [0, 1]. The lower R, the higher the probability
that the node is a blackhole. R is a local notion, because it is
calculated by each node on the basis of its own network experience.
In other words, there is no global consensus on the reputation of
a given node. This is in order to save the node energy and avoid
both the tra c overhead, and the technical complications related
to maintain such a consensus. By Rij we denote the reputation of
node i calculated by node j. Every node j calculates the reputation
Rij of every node i it meets, as described below.
A node uses reputation to contrast blackholes as follows.
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Definition 1 (Local Utility Function) Let Ui be the Utility Func-
tion of i and Rij be the reputation of node i at node j, then the
Local Utility Function, Lij, is given by:
Lij = Rij ⇥ Ui (3.1)
Intuitively Lij represents how much node j considers node i
able to forward messages. Node j uses the local utility function to
choose a node. In practice, it chooses as the forwarder of a message
the node i having the highest value of Lij. The rational basis of
this choice is the following. Assume that a node i is a blackhole.
Thus node j assigns a low reputation value to node i, i.e., Rij ! 0.
It follows that the value of Lij ! 0 and thus j does not select i as
a forwarding node.
More formally, let D be the event “node i delivers a message”
and B the event “node i is not blackhole”. The probability of
successful message delivery P (D) is given by the Bayes theorem:
P (D) =
P (B)P (D|B)
P (B|D) (3.2)
where P (D|B) = Ui, where Ui is the Utility Function of node i.
This is because if a node is not blackhole (event P (B) = 1), the
event D happens with a probability given by the chances of the
node to forward a message (i.e. Ui). Furthermore, P (B) = Rij,
where Rij is the reputation given by the node j to the node i. This
is because a node is not blackhole with a probability equal to its
reputation. Thus we have:
P (D) =
RijUi
P (B|D) (3.3)
but P (B|D) = 1 because if i forwards messages, i is not blackhole.
Therefore,
P (D) = Ui ⇥Rij (3.4)
where P (D) = Lij.
Figure 3.1 shows the flow diagram of the algorithm used by
RCAR to select a forwarding node. Assume that a node s, the
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Figure 3.1: Flow Diagram of the RCAR algorithm.
sender, sends a message m to a node r, the receiver. If a route
exists between s and r, the node s exploits the synchronous rout-
ing, otherwise it exploits the asynchronous routing as described in
Section 3.3. When the synchronous routing is available, the node
s selects the next hop n to reach r according to the DSDV proto-
col, as in CAR. Once selected the next hop n, the node s checks
whether Lsn > 0. If this is the case, it means that the node n is
not blackhole, so that the node s sends it the message m. Oth-
erwise, if Lsn = 0, the node s tries to exploit the asynchronous
routing. As already said, the asynchronous routing is used also
when a route from the sender to the receiver does not exist. In
the case of asynchronous routing, the sender s selects the node c
having the highest Lsc. In order to reach the node c, the node s
exploits the synchronous routing, that is, it selects the next hop n
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according to the DSDV protocol, in order to reach c. Once received
the message m, the node c stores it in its local bu↵er. As before,
node s sends the messagem to n only if Lsn > 0, otherwise it stores
m in its local bu↵er. Periodically both the nodes s and c try to
send the messages contained in their local bu↵er by repeating the
previously described mechanism.
We have made the choice that node j forwards a message to a
given next hop n if and only if Lnj > 0 because at the same time
we want both to contrast blackholes and preserve the advantages
introduced by the use of synchronous routing.
Note that when the synchronous routing is used, a node s sends
the message to a node n only if Lsn > 0, while when the asyn-
chronous routing is used, the node s selects the node n having the
largest value of Lsn. This is due to the fact that in the synchronous
routing the Utility Function of the node n does not influence the
routing so that we can assume that Usn = 1. This means that
the value of Lsn depends only on the reputation. In this case, the
message must not be sent to a node if it is a blackhole. The node
n is blackhole if Rsn  ✓, where ✓ is a threshold to consider a node
blackhole. Without loosing in generality, we can assume ✓ = 0,
because if Rsn = 0 the node n is certainly blackhole. In contrast,
in the asynchronous routing, 0  Usn  1 and thus the value of
Lsn depends also on it. This means that it is not su cient to check
whether Lsn > 0 to select the forwarding node, because the proto-
col must also take into account the node having the largest Utility
Function.
3.4.2 The Reputation Update Protocol
The Reputation Update Protocol (RUP) is the mechanism used by
RCAR to update reputations of nodes. Integrity and authenticity
of RUP information is protected by means of digital signatures.
In particular, we assume that every node has a pair (public key,
private key) and a certificate binding its identifier to its public key
signed by a Certification Authority (CA) trusted by all the nodes.
By hxia we indicate the digital signature of node a on quantity
x. Deploying a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is in general a
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problematic task due to the problems connected to certificate re-
vocation and, more in general, the need of an online CA. Solutions
have been proposed in [52–55]. However, at the state of art, PKI is
the common solution used in DTNs to authenticate messages and
provide their integrity [39, 44, 45].
The basic idea behind the RUP is based on the following obser-
vation. If a node d receives a message, then all nodes the message
passed through are well behaving or, otherwise, d would have not
received the message. This means that, upon receiving a message,
node d can increase the reputation of all nodes the message passed
through, provided we can keep track of them.
We keep track of nodes a message has passed through as follows.
Every message m carries the the list of identifiers of nodes the
message has passed through. We call node list (nlist) such a list.
Upon receiving message m, a node adds itself to the nlist. A node
adds itself only once, even though a message passes through that
node many times. A malicious node could modify the nlist and add
identifiers of nodes the message has not passed through in order
to increase the reputation of other malicious nodes. In order to
avoid such modifications, the message carries also a list of digital
signatures  1,  2, ... i 1 that prove that the message has actually
passed through the nodes specified in the node list. We call slist
such a list. The digital signature  i establishes an unbreakable link
between the node ci receiving m and the node ci 1 from which it
has receivedm. In practice through  i we are sure that the message
m has gone from ci 1 to ci without passing throughout any other
intermediate node.
The length of the slist influences both the message length and
thus the RCAR communication overhead as well as the message
processing time and thus the RCAR processing overhead. However,
as we will show in Section 3.5, the average number of nodes a
message passes through is small, namely about 1.5 on average.
This means that the overhead added by the digital signatures is
practically negligible.
Let us suppose that a sender s sends a message:
m = (mid, p, d, ts, nlist, slist) (3.5)
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where mid is the unique identifier associated to each message,
p is the message payload, d is the destination node and ts is the
time at which the message is sent. Initially nlist and slist are
empty. They are iteratively constructed as follows. Suppose that
the forwarding node c1 receives the message from s. It updates the
nlist and the slist as follows:
nlist = c1 (3.6)
slist =  1 (3.7)
In the most general case, node c1 forwards the message m. When
m passes through the i-th forwarding node ci, i > 0, let us assume
that nlist = {c1, c2, .., ci 1} and slist = { 1,  2, ... i 1}. Then, ci
updates nlist and slist as follows:
nlist nlist||ci (3.8)
slist slist||h i 1, ciici (3.9)
where || indicates the append operation and hxici indicates the
digital signature made by node ci on content x.
Upon receiving message m, the receiver d verifies i) the digital
signatures contained in the slist and ii) if the list of nodes con-
tained in the nlist corresponds to that contained in the slist. If
the check is successful, it extracts the list of nodes from the nlist
and increases the reputation of all those nodes.
The described protocol allows only the receiver d to update
the reputation of the nodes. This basic mechanism can be im-
proved, using two additional mechanisms: ack-based and step-by-
step. With the ack-based, the destination node d builds an ac-
knowledgment message ack = (mid, ts, clist, slist), and sends it
back to the sender s. The nlist and slist of the acknowledgment
are initialized with the nlist and the slist of the original message.
Furthermore, during the ack forwarding process, the nlist and the
slist are updated as described before for standard messages. The
ack behaves as a standard message except it is not acknowledged
in its turn. The ack message may follow a di↵erent route than
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the original message m. In practice, each node forwarding the ack
adds itself in the nlist and slist, only if it is not already contained
in them. Upon receiving the ack message, the original sender s
verifies the digital signatures contained in the slist and the corre-
spondence between the nodes contained in the nlist and the slist,
and if this check is successful, it increases the reputation of the
nodes contained in the nlist.
The steb-by-step mechanism is an improvement of the previous
one. All the nodes traversed by the message and the corresponding
ack extract the corresponding slist and nlist, verify the digital
signatures contained in the slist and the mutual consistency of
nlist and slist. Then they update the reputation of the nodes
contained in the nlist. As it turns out, the reputation update
process involves only certain nodes, namely those receiving the
original message and the ack. We have made this choice to keep low
the DTN management tra c. In the performance evaluation tests
described in Section 3.5, we have used the step-by-step technique.
3.4.3 The aging mechanism
The just described mechanism allows every node to increase the
reputation of all the nodes contained in the nlist of a message
that passes through the node. However, if a message gets lost, a
node has no means to know whether a blackhole has dropped it
or another situation has occurred (e.g. message dropped for bu↵er
overflow or TTL elapsed). Furthermore, even though the node
could know that a message has not been delivered, it could not
know which node along the path has misbehaved. Thus, in order
to cope with blackholes, a mechanism based on aging is used to
decrease the reputation of all the nodes. In practice, periodically
a node decreases the reputations of all the nodes. This choice is
done to have a conservative policy, because a node does not know
which node has dropped the message.
We assume that the reputation increases and decreases linearly.
That is, reputation R may be increased by a positive non-zero
quantity X, i.e. R  max(1, R + X), or decreased by a positive
non-zero quantity Y , i.e., R  max(0, R   Y ). Quantities X and
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Y may be di↵erent if we wish that the reputation increases and
decreases at di↵erent speeds. In an optimistic policy, node i may
initially consider j trusted, i.e., initially Rji = 1. In contrast, in
a conservative policy, node i may not initially trust j at all, i.e.,
intially Rji = 0. Intermediate policies can be defined.
In the aging mechanism, it is important the choice of the value
of the decrease period T . On one hand, a too large value of T
generates a high number of false negatives, because reputation of
blackholes is decreased too slowly. On the other hand, a too small
value of T , instead, produces a high number of false positives, i.e.
well-behaving nodes are classified as blackholes because their rep-
utation decreases too quickly before acknowledgments come back
to the sender.
In order to fulfil the requirements of a DTN, the decrease pe-
riod T cannot be fixed, because DTN conditions change. The de-
crease period T could be expressed as a function of the Round
Trip Time (RTT). Upon sending a message, the sender attaches
the message a timestamp specifying the moment in which the mes-
sage was originated. So doing, upon receiving the corresponding
acknowledgment, the sender node is able to calculate the RTT of
the message. This means that whenever a node receives an ac-
knowledgment, it can update the decrease period. In this way the
decrease period follows the RTT and is updated dynamically ac-
cording to network conditions. However, due to the nature of DTN,
an acknowledgment may get lost so that the decrease period is not
updated correctly. In order to dynamically update the decrease
period even when the RTT is not (always) available, we employ
a mechanism to predict the future values of RTT on the basis of
the past history. We us Kalman filters [38]. Kalman filters were
originally thought for automatic control systems theory. They are
able to estimate the next state of a dynamic system on the basis of
some observations. The advantage of using Kalman filters is based
on the fact that they are able to predict the next current state even
when the current observation is not available. Furthermore, they
do not require to store the whole past history of the system so that
they can be used also by resource constrained vehicles.
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3.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section we evaluate performance of RCAR via simulation.
RCAR has been compared to T-ProPHET [39], a reputation-based
protocol for DTN that is both very recent and the most similar to
RCAR. Furthermore, we also compare RCAR to Epidemic Routing
(ER) [31]. In brief, ER relies on the idea that both the sender and
any forwarding node forwards a message to all the nodes it meets
until the message arrives at destination. However, in order to avoid
overwhelming the network, a forwarding node never forwards a
message twice.
In our evaluation we also compare the improvement introduced
by RCAR on CAR [32] to the improvement introduced by T-
ProPHET on ProPHET [33]. CAR and ProPHET have been al-
ready compared in [32]. In the absence of blackholes CAR out-
performs ProPHET from several standpoints. In particular, CAR
achieves a higher delivery ratio, a smaller number of sent messages
and a smaller propagation delay than ProPHET. This is due to the
fact that CAR has a more e cient mechanism to update delivery
probabilities than ProPHET. However, as we are going to describe
below, this update mechanism allows blackholes to attract a larger
number of messages in CAR than in ProPHET. It follows that
CAR is more susceptible to blackholes than ProPHET.
In order to make performance evaluations and comparisons, we
have simulated RCAR, CAR and ER using the OMNet++ simu-
lator, while for ProPHET and T-ProPHET we have taken results
from [39]. In order to compare CAR, RCAR, ER, ProPHET and
T-ProPHET in the same conditions, we have considered the same
simulation scenarios as described in [39]. In particular, we have
created blackholes and well-behaving nodes moving around a fixed
area. Only well-behaving nodes send/receive messages while black-
holes have been implemented as nodes distributing a delivery prob-
ability Ub = 1 for all the destinations. Once attracted a message,
a blackhole drops it. In the case of ER, it does not employs deliv-
ery probability, so that a blackhole is a node which drops received
messages.
We have set the number of well-behaving nodes to 20. We have
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Parameter Value
Network area 1km2, 2km2, 3km2
Number of well behaving nodes 20
Number of blackholes 2,6,10,14
Communication range 25 m
Node speed 0–5 m/sec
Data generation rate 1 message/second
Simulation time 8900sec.
Warmup period 300 sec.
RTTI 3 sec
Number of runs 20
Bu↵er Size 1000 messages
Reputation increment 0.1
Reputation decrement 0.05
Initial reputation 1
Table 3.1: Configuration parameters.
performed two sets of simulations: a) we have varied the network
area size (1000m ⇥ 1000m, 2000m ⇥ 2000m and 3000m ⇥ 3000m),
while keeping fixed the number of blackholes (6 blackholes), b)
we have varied the number of blackholes (2,6,10,14) while keeping
fixed the network area size (1000m ⇥ 1000m). Each node has a
communication range equal to 25 m, with a variable speed from 0
to 5 m/sec. Each node generates a message with a rate of 1 mes-
sage per second and has a bu↵er size of 1000 messages. For each
simulation we have performed 20 runs, each lasting 8900 sec. In
each run we have set the warm up period to 300 sec. The warm
up period is the initial time needed to build the routing tables
for synchronous routing. We have set the routing table transmis-
sion interval (RTTI) to 3 sec. The RTTI represents the interval of
retransmission of the routing tables. In practice, each node retrans-
mits its routing table to the other nodes every RTTI seconds. We
have set the initial reputation to 1, the reputation increment X to
0.1, while the reputation decrement Y to the half of the reputation
increment (i.e. 0.05). Table 3.1 resumes configuration parameters.
We have measured the following metrics:
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• Node List Length. It is the number of nodes contained into
an acknowledgment, when it arrives to the original sender of
the message.
• Delivery Ratio. It is the ratio between the number of received
messages and the number of sent messages. Acknowledge-
ments do not contribute to the delivery ratio. In practice, it
measures the fraction of messages the network is able to de-
liver in the presence of blackholes. Ideally the delivery ratio
should be equal to 1.
• Attraction Ratio. It is the ratio between the number of at-
tracted data message by the blackholes and the number of
sent data messages. Acknowledgments do not contribute to
the attraction ratio, although blackholes attract acknowledg-
ments too. In practice, the attraction ratio measures the
fraction of messages the blackholes are able to attract. Ide-
ally the attraction ratio should be equal to 0.
• Average Delay. It is the time between the generation of a
message and its delivery to the final receiver. It is calcu-
lated as the average of all the messages received, included
acknowledgments. Ideally the average delay should be equal
to 0.
• Total Number of Sent Messages. It is the total number of
messages sent in the network, including routing messages and
acknowledgments.
3.5.1 Node List Length
Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of the Node List Length versus
the network area sizes. Each tick on the x-axis represents the
node list length, that is, the number of nodes contained in the
acknowledgment. We note that for about the 50% of messages the
node list contains 1.5 nodes and only sporadically the node list
length is two or longer.
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Figure 3.2: Nodes List Length Distribution.
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Figure 3.3: Delivery Ratio vs Network Area Size.
3.5.2 Delivery Ratio
Figure 3.3 shows the delivery ratio of RCAR, CAR, ER, ProPHET
and T-ProPHET with respect to di↵erent network area sizes. In all
the cases ER outperforms all the other protocols, paying the cost of
a very high number of sent messages, as explained in Section 3.5.5.
However, its delivery ratio decreases while increasing the network
area size. This is due to the fact, that when the network area size
increases, the probability that two nodes meets is low so that their
bu↵ers are not emptied. This causes bu↵er overflow and many
messages get lost.
In all the cases RCAR outperforms T-ProPHET. It is interest-
ing to note that when the network area size is 1000 m ⇥ 1000 m
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Figure 3.5: Delivery Ratio vs Number of malicious nodes.
and 2000 m ⇥ 2000 m, CAR reaches the lowest delivery ratio. This
is due to the fact that when the network is small, in CAR the syn-
chronous routing works, while ProPHET has not a synchronous
routing. If the synchronous routing is very e cient when there
are not blackholes [32], it does not work as expected in presence
of blackholes, because as the network is small, the probability to
meet a blackhole is high so that many messages are sent to them
and they are dropped. When the network area size increases (3000
m ⇥ 3000 m), CAR outperforms both T-ProPHET and ProPHET.
This is due to the fact that when the network area is large, CAR
uses the asynchronous routing. As the network area is large, the
probability to meet a blackhole is smaller so that the asynchronous
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Figure 3.6: Delivery Ratio Increase vs Number of malicious nodes.
routing works quite e ciently.
Figure 3.4 shows the performance increase in delivery ratio of
RCAR (T-ProPHET) on CAR (ProPHET) with respect to di↵er-
enct network area sizes. The performance increase in delivery ratio
is calculated as the di↵erence between the delivery ratio of RCAR
(T-ProPHET) and that of CAR (ProPHET). The greater the per-
formance increase the greater the increase introduced by RCAR
(T-ProPHET) on CAR (ProPHET). We note that in all the cases
the performance increase in delivery ratio introduced by RCAR on
CAR is higher than that introduced by T-ProPHET on ProPHET.
Figure 3.5 shows the delivery ratio of RCAR, CAR, ER,
ProPHET and T-ProPHET with respect to an increasing num-
ber of blackholes. ER outperforms all the other protocols, except
in the scenario with 14 blackholes where it reaches a delivery ra-
tio comparable to that of RCAR and CAR and smaller than that
of T-ProPHET. This is due to the fact that when the number of
blackhole increases, the probability that a node meets a blackhole
is larger and consequently is larger the probability that a node
forwards replicas of messages to balckholes. As a results many
messages are dropped and the delivery ratio decreases.
When the number of blackholes is lower (2 and 6) RCAR out-
performs all the other protocols whereas when the number of black-
holes is high (10 and 14) T-ProPHET outperforms all the other
protocols. However, in all the cases, the performance increase in
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Figure 3.8: Attraction Ratio Increase vs Network Area.
terms of delivery ratio introduced by RCAR on CAR is higher than
that introduced by T-ProPHET on ProPHET (Figure 3.6).
3.5.3 Attraction Ratio
Figures 3.7 and 3.9 show the attraction ratio of RCAR, CAR,
ProPHET and T-ProPHET with respect to an increasing network
area size and an increasing number of blackholes respectively. We
do not show the values for ER, because in ER a blackhole simply
drops the messages it receives without attracting them. In ER, in
fact, a blackhole has no means to attract a message, as the routing
mechanism sends messages to all the nodes.
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nodes.
We note that the attraction ratio of CAR is higher than that
of ProPHET in all the scenarios so that also RCAR attracts more
messages than T-ProPHET. However this is due to the di↵erent
mechanisms adopted by CAR and ProPHET to update delivery
probabilities. In fact in CAR a node calculates another node de-
livery probability exactly as the delivery probability sent by that
node. In particular, if a blackhole sends a delivery probability
Ub = 1, every node i receiving that delivery probability, assumes
that the blackhole has a delivery probability Uib = Ub = 1. In
ProPHET, instead, a node i calculates the delivery probability of
a node j as the combination of three factors: a) the previous deliv-
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ery probability assigned by i to j, b) the probability for i to meet j,
which is calculated locally by i, c) the delivery probability sent by
j to i. This means that if a blackhole sends a delivery probability
Ub = 1 to a node i, the node i calculates the delivery probability
Uib for that blackhole keeping into account the described factors so
that in general Uib  Ub. It follows that in CAR the probability to
choose a blackhole is higher than in ProPHET.
It is interesting to note that when the network area size in-
creases, the attraction ratio of CAR decreases, while that of
ProPHET increases. This is due to the di↵erent mechanisms used
by CAR and ProPHET to update the delivery probabilities. When
the network area size increases, the probability that a node meets a
blackhole is lower. However, in ProPHET the lower the probability
to meet a carrier, the higher the influence of the delivery proba-
bility sent by that carrier. In other words, if a blackhole sends a
delivery probability Ub = 1 to a node i, if the network area size is
small, node i calculates Uib  Ub, while if the network area size is
large, node i calculates Uib = Ub [33]. In CAR, instead, the less
the probability to meet a carrier, the less the probability that the
carrier is chosen as forwarder.
Figures 3.8 and 3.10 show the attraction ratio increase of RCAR
over CAR and T-ProPHET over ProPHET. The attraction ratio
increase is calculated as the di↵erence between the attraction ratio
of CAR (ProPHET) and RCAR (T-ProPHET). The greater the
attraction ratio increase the greater the improvement introduced
by the RCAR (T-ProPHET) over CAR (ProPHET). RCAR out-
performs T-ProPHET in the scenario with a small network area,
while when the network area size increases T-ProPHET outper-
forms RCAR.
3.5.4 Average Delay
Figure 3.11 and 3.12 show the average delay of RCAR, CAR, ER,
ProPHET and T-ProPHET with respect to an increasing network
area size and an increasing number of blackholes, respectively. We
note that ER reaches a smaller average delay than T-ProPHET
and ProPHET and a greater average delay than RCAR and CAR.
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Furthermore, the average delay of ProPHET is higher than that
of CAR in all the scenarios so that also the average delay of T-
ProPHET is higher than that of RCAR. The fact that the average
delay of CAR is lower than that of ProPHET has been already dis-
cussed in [32]. In practice, CAR employs also synchronous routing
while ProPHET does not.
3.5.5 Total number of sent messages
Figures 3.13 and 3.14 show the total number of sent messages in
the network by RCAR, CAR and ER. We do not show the values
for T-ProPHET and ProPHET, because the authors in [39] do
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not analyze this metric. We note that ER sends about 5.38 ⇥ 106
messages in the worst case (scenario with 6 blackholes and network
area of 1000 m ⇥ 1000 m) and 1.046 ⇥ 106 messages in the best
case (scenario with 6 blackholes and network area of 3000 m ⇥
3000 m). RCAR instead sends about 1.01 ⇥ 106 messages in the
worst case (scenario with 10 blackholes and network area of 1000
m ⇥ 1000 m) and 0.2 ⇥ 106 messages in the best case (scenario
with 6 blackholes and network area of 3000 m ⇥ 3000 m).
We note that ER transmits a number of messages that is about
five times greater than RCAR. This large overhead allows ER to
outperform the other protocols in terms of delivery ratio. However,
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such a gain is very limited. For instance, in the case of 6 blackholes
and a network size equal to 3000 m ⇥ 3000 m the delivery ratio
of ER is 0.88 whereas that of RCAR is 0.77 (Figure 3.13). It
follows that from a practical point of view such an improvement
of delivery ratio is not su cient to justify the corresponding large
communication overhead. For this reason, ER is not advisable in
a DTN.
RCAR generates a greater number of messages than CAR be-
cause of the acknowledgment mechanism. The overhead in number
of messages introduced by RCAR to CAR is 53.95% in the worst
case (scenario with 2 blackholes and network area of 1000 m ⇥
1000 m) and 12.36% in the best case (scenario with 6 blackholes
and network area of 3000 m ⇥ 3000 m). The high overhead in-
troduced by RCAR to CAR in the worst case is because in this
scenario CAR has also a high Attraction Ratio (Figure 3.9). This
means that CAR delivers a low number of messages, because many
of them are dropped by blackholes.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have presented a reputation-based protocol to
contrast blackholes in a DTN. The protocol has been integrated in
CAR and the resulting RCAR protocol has been compared with
T-ProPHET, a state-of-the-art reputation-based routing protocol
deriving from ProPHET, from several viewpoints. As it turns out
RCAR outperforms T-ProPHET in terms of delivery ration and
average delay. Furthermore, the improvement that RCAR makes
to CAR always outperforms the improvement that T-ProPHET
makes to ProPHET. In addition to this, we believe that RCAR
has the following merits.
• RCAR proves that an e↵ective and e cient reputation-based
routing protocol for DTN can be based on a local notion of
reputation. As it turns out from Section 3.5, such a local
notion allows us to e↵ectively contrast blackholes without
incurring in the overhead and the technical complications in-
herent to maintaining a global notion of reputation.
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• Furthermore, RCAR has a reduced overhead. Actually,
in RCAR the information for reputation management is
properly integrated in data and acknowledgement messages.
So, RCAR does not need to resort to expensive broad-
cast/multicast communication for reputation management.
In addition, simulations show that the node list is short so
making sustainable the related communication and compu-
tation overhead.
• Finally, RCAR shows that it is able to adapt to the highly
changing conditions of a DTN. In particular RCAR is able to
adapt its aging period so reducing the chance of false positives
and false negatives.
Chapter 4
Publish/Subscribe Systems
Quello che facciamo e` soltanto una goccia
nell’oceano. Ma se non ci fosse quella goccia
all’oceano mancherebbe.
Teresa di Calcutta (1910–1997)
4.1 Introduction
Publish-subscribe is a communication paradigm that supports
dynamic, asynchronous, many-to-many communication in a dis-
tributed system [3]. In a publish-subscribe (pub-sub) system a
network of brokers is responsible for routing messages from pub-
lishers to subscribers. Messages are routed based on their topics,
an information descriptor contained in the messages themselves.
Subscribers have to declare their interests in specific topics by is-
suing subscriptions to brokers.
When deployed over a wide, large scale distributed environ-
ment, a pub-sub service must distribute messages to a dynamic
population of publishers through a network of brokers belonging
to distinct possibly untrusted authoritative domains. Such an en-
vironment raises serious security concerns [7, 56]. Actually, an ad-
versary who succeeds in impersonating a client or a broker can
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eavesdrop messages, modify them or inject fake ones. An adver-
sary pretending to be a broker can even drop and divert messages.
Security of publish-subscribe systems has become an emerging
research issue. Most of proposed works have investigated how to
e ciently support secure services, enclosing access control and se-
cure end-to-end delivery of messages, over a network of untrusted
brokers [6, 57–62]. In this chapter we face with a di↵erent prob-
lem, namely how to support an overlay of brokers that unite to
provide confidentiality and integrity in end-to-end message deliv-
ery. This approach starts from the key observation that the need
for mechanisms to allow organizations to collaborate securely is
recognized in many environments, from military to industrial and
academic [63]. Thus our proposal revolves around the notion of
security group, a coalition of brokers, each representing a given or-
ganization, interconnected by secure connections. A security group
guarantees confidentiality and integrity in end-to-end message de-
livery. Furthermore, it allows clients belonging to any organization
to connect to any broker in the group to publish and subscribe.
So doing, security groups support mobility of clients. Security
groups are dynamic in that brokers may join and leave over the
lifetime of the collaboration. Brokers are trusted in that a bro-
ker can join a security group if and only if it fulfills a predefined
group admission policy . Trust between brokers is generally estab-
lished through some extra-technological means, such as contracts,
treaties, or memoranda of agreement [63]. However, after the trust
relationships between brokers have been established the remaining
process by which a broker joins a security group is automatic. Fi-
nally, security groups are closed in that no message published in a
security group can be notified outside the group. Communication
between security groups needs is supported at the application level
by the gateway , a special client that can publish and subscribe in
both groups.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we discuss
the security requirements the publish-subscribe system must ful-
fill. In Section 4.3 we introduce the notions of security groups and
group admission policy, and present a group admission protocol .
Furthermore, we describe client management and inter-group com-
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munication. In Section 4.4 we briefly discuss an early prototype.
In Section 4.5 we compare our system with related works, and,
finally, we finally draw our conclusions in Section 4.6.
4.2 Security Requirements
In a distributed setting, a pub-sub service is implemented by a
network of brokers that is called the Dispatching Network . In such
a network, two directly connected brokers are called peers . Brokers
provide clients the interface to the pub-sub system and cooperate
in order to provide content-based routing and filtering based on
topics, and reliable delivery of messages. We assume that brokers
are fixed whereas clients are mobile. This means that at di↵erent
times a client can be connected to di↵erent brokers.
When deployed over a large scale, wide area setting, a pub-
sub service must handle information dissemination across distinct
authoritative domains, heterogeneous platforms and a large, dy-
namic population of publishers and subscribers. Such an environ-
ment raises serious security concerns. Actually, an adversary who
succeeds in passing herself as a client or a broker can eavesdrop
messages, modify them or inject fake ones. An adversary pretend-
ing to be a broker can drop messages or divert them to bogus
clients.
A secure publish-subscribe system must meet the confidentiality
and integrity security requirements [6,7]. In general, integrity refers
to the trustworthiness of information and system and it is usually
phrased in terms of preventing improper or unauthorized modi-
fications. In a publish-subscribe system, integrity can be stated
in terms of preventing improper or unauthorized modifications of
messages, but also of subscriptions, and service [56]. Actually,
subscription integrity is crucial as subscriptions form the basis for
routing and forwarding. Furthermore, the integrity of the pub-sub
service is crucial because if an adversary managed to join the dis-
patching network, the adversary could insert bogus subscriptions
and act as a bogus subscriber to neighboring brokers, ignore the
routing algorithm and route messages to arbitrary destinations or
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Figure 4.1: A Security Group.
drop them altogether. For this reason, in a secure publish-subscribe
system, routing must be performed by trusted brokers only.
A publish-subscribe system has also to satisfy the secrecy re-
quirement. In general, secrecy refers to the ability to keep the
content of information from all but those authorized to have it.
In a publish-subscribe system, secrecy can be phrased in terms of
preventing any non-authorized entity to see messages and subscrip-
tions. When messages and subscriptions contain sensitive content,
publishers and subscribers may wish to keep them secret. This
is especially important in a large pub-sub system where informa-
tion may travel through network segments that are not necessarily
trusted. For this reason, in a secure pub-sub system, messages
should travel along secure channels and be handled in the clear by
trusted brokers.
4.3 Secure Pub-Sub System
In order to fulfill the security requirements, we organize brokers
in security groups . A security group is composed of a connected
subset of brokers that provide a closed and secure routing of mes-
sages. Closed routing means that a message published in the group
is routed within the group and never leaves it. In other words, a
message is forwarded only to brokers belonging to the group. Se-
cure routing means that a security group guarantees confidentiality
and integrity of routed messages by requiring that any pair of peers
in the group are interconnected with a secure connection. Fig-
ure 4.1 shows a security group composed of four brokers, namely
A, B, C, and D interconnected by secure connections.
Only trusted brokers can join a security group. The trust of
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one broker with respect to another is generally established through
some extra-technological means, such as contracts, treaties, or
memoranda of agreement. After the trust relationships between
brokers have been established the remaining process by which a
broker joins a group is automatic.
A broker willing to join a security group must comply with
the Group Admission Policiy (GAP) of that group. The GAP
specifies the trust relationship that the broker must have with the
security group in order to be admitted to the group itself. Possible
policies are: a) the One Broker Policy (OBP), according to which
at least one member of the group must trust the broker willing to
join; b) the Majority Brokers Policy (MBP), according to which
a majority of members of the group must trust the broker willing
to join, and, finally, c) the All Brokers Policy (ABP), according to
which all members of the group must trust the broker willing to
join. Of course other policies can be defined as needed. A group
admission protocol ascertains whether the broker requesting to join
is indeed allowed to join according to the given Group Admission
Policy (GAP).
Clients wanting to use the security services provided by a secu-
rity group must establish a secure connection to the group. Only
trusted clients can connect to the security group. A client is trusted
by the group if and only if it is trusted by at least one broker in
the group. Figure 4.1 shows a publisher P and two subscribers, S1
and S2 connected to the group. Any path leading from P to S1, or
S2, is composed of secure connections.
4.3.1 Keys and Certificates
We assume that each principal has a pair of private and public
keys. In order to guarantee the authenticity and validity of public
keys, we use certificates. A certificate is a data structure composed
of two parts: a data part and a signature part. The data part con-
tains cleartext data including, as a minimum, a public key, a string
identifying the principal to be associated there with, and a validity
period. The signature part contains the digital signature of a Cer-
tification Authority (CA) over the data part, thereby binding the
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principal’s identity to the specified public key. The Certification
Authority is a trusted third party whose signature on the certifi-
cate vouches for the authenticity of the public key bound to the
principal identity. Anyone with the public key of this authority
can verify this assertion and, providing he trusts the authority, he
uses the indicated key to authenticate the indicated principal. For
simplicity, but without lack of generality, we assume a single cer-
tification authority CA, trusted by all principals. The public key
of the certification authority must be distributed in an authenti-
cated manner to every principal. We assume this is done on-line
by means of well-known methods.
Finally, we assume that a couple of principals (brokers and
clients) can use certificates to establish a secure connection between
each other. A secure connection implies mutual authentication
of principals and prevents eavesdropping, tampering and message
forgery. Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and Transpor Layer Security
(TLS) can be used to establish secure connections [64, 65].
4.3.2 The group admission protocol
Every broker records the brokers it trusts in the Trusted Broker List
(TBL) that has one element for each trusted broker. It follows that
a trust relationship between two brokers is established by reserving
an element for the one in the TBL of the other and vice versa.
Furthermore, every broker keeps track of the membership of the
security group by means of the membership variable members . In
addition, a broker keeps track of the brokers it is connected to
by means of the Trusted Peers Table (TPT), which has one entry
for each connected broker. Finally, the Group Admission Policy
is implemented by a logical policy evaluation function, pev , that
takes a set of brokers S as input and returns TRUE if the set is
consistent with the GAP; FALSE otherwise.
In the most general case, a broker may be connected to one
or more other brokers in the security group. For instance, in Fig-
ure 4.2, broker B is connected to three other brokers: A, E, and
D. A broker joins a security group upon establishing the first con-
nection with any broker in the group. When a broker leaves the
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Figure 4.2: Group admission protocol.
security group all existing connections to the brokers of the group
has are severed.
With reference to Figure 4.2, in order to join a security group
G, a broker R establishes a secure connection to any broker in G,
say B, and sends this broker a join request specifying its identifier
R as a parameter (Figure 4.2.a). Upon receiving a join request,
broker B checks whether broker R is in membersB to ascertain
whether R is already member of G. If this not the case, broker B
starts an execution instance of the group admission protocol (Fig-
ure 4.2.a–c), to check whether the requesting broker R fulfills the
group admission policy (Figure 4.2.c) If R does, the broker is ad-
mitted to the group. Otherwise, R is not admitted and the secure
connection between R and B may be either closed or degraded to
an insecure one.
More in detail, the group admission protocol consists in the
following actions. Initially, the broker B publishes in the group G
a group admission request message, ga-request, that specifies the
identifier R of the requesting broker (Figure 4.2.a).
Upon receiving a ga-request message, every broker Bi in G
searches its TBL to ascertain whether it has a trust relationship
with the requesting broker R specified in the message, and returns
the result to B in a group admission reply message, ga-reply (Fig-
ure 4.2.b).
Upon receiving a ga-reply message from every broker in Bi
in G, the broker B determines the subset T (R) ✓ G of brokers
in G that have a trust relationship with R. Then, B computes
outcome  pev(T (R)). If the outcome is TRUE, B reserves an
entry for R into its Trusted Peers Table, updates the membership
96 CHAPTER 4. PUBLISH/SUBSCRIBE SYSTEMS
membersB  membersB [ {R}, and returns R a successful join
reply message that contains membersB, the current membership of
the group, and pev , the policy evaluation function. Otherwise, if
the outcome is FALSE, B returns an usuccessful join reply message
to R and severes the secure connection with R, or downgrades it
to an insecure one. Finally, B publishes in G a group admission
outcome message, ga-outcome, that carries the value of outcome.
Finally, upon receiving a ga-outcome message from B, every
broker Bi in G checks whether the message contains the TRUE
value. If this is the case, Bi inserts R into its membership,
members i  members i [ {R}. Otherwise, the identifier R is
dropped.
For performance reasons, the group admission protocol can be
optimized. One possible optimization consists in the summariza-
tion of the protocol as follows. With reference to Figure 4.2 b),
instead of propagating all the receiving ga-replies, a broker of the
group could send a unique ga-reply, containing a summary of the
received ones. For example, if the ga-reply coming from node F is
a↵ermative and that coming from node C is negative, the ga-reply
sent by node A contains a summary: (one negative, two positives)
(supposing that A’s TBL contains R) or (two negatives, one posi-
tive) (if A’s TBL does not contain R).
A further optimization depends on the chosen admission policy.
If for example, the chosen policy is the OBP and if B is the is the
broker with which the requesting broker R has a trust relationship,
then the execution of the protocol is not necessary and B can
send soon the ga-outcome message. It is worthwhile to notice that
typically, the broker that is topologically closer with which a secure
connection is established it is also the broker with which a trust
relationship exists.
When a member Bi of the security group wants to leave the
group G, Bi publishes in the security group a group leave message.
Upon receiving a group leave message, every broker Bj removes the
leaving broker from the secure group membership, membersj  
membersj \ {R}. Furthermore, if Bj has any connection with Bi,
then Bj severes it and removes the entry reserved for Bi in its
Trusted Peer Table TPTj.
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As a final comment, we point out that, by default, every broker
in the secure group subscribes to group admission and group leave
events and messages.
4.3.3 Management of clients
Similar to the case of inter-broker trust, the trust of one broker in
a client is generally established through some extra-technological
means. Every broker records the clients it trusts in the Trusted
Clients Table (TCT).
A client C can connect to a security group G if and only if the
client is trusted by at least one broker in G. In order to connect to
G, a client C establishes a secure connection with any broker B in
G and sends it a connect request message. Upon receiving a con-
nect request message, a broker starts an execution instance of the
client admission protocol , to check whether the requesting client
can connect to the security group (if the requesting client cannot
connect to the security group, the secure connection between C
and B may be either closed or degraded to an insecure one).
More in detail, the client admission protocol consists in the fol-
lowing actions. The broker B publishes a client connection request
specifying the identifier C of the client. Upon receiving a client
connect request, any broker Bi in G checks whether C is contained
in its Trusted Clients Table (TCT), and returns B the results of
the check in the client connection reply . Upon receiving a client
connection reply from every broeker in the group, broker B de-
termines whether the client C can connect to G by ascertaining
whether at least one broker in the group trusts C.
4.3.4 Communication between Security
Groups
In this section we analyze communication between security groups.
In particular, we require that two or more security groups can
communicate with each other, that is, messages published into a
group can be notified to subscribers belonging to another group.
For instance, with reference to Figure 4.3, messages published by
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PA, belonging to the group GA, have to be notified to SB, belonging
to group GB.
As security groups are closed, we solve the problem at the ap-
plication level through the abstraction of gateway , i.e., a client that
acts as publisher in one group and subscriber in the other. With
reference to Figure 4.3, the gateway GW is connected to both secu-
rity groups GA and GB, receives publications from the former group
and re-publishes them in the latter. Thus, thee gateway GW must
be both trusted by both groups and compliant with any access
control policies enforced by both security groups [58, 62].
Let us suppose that messages belonging to topic “T” published
in group GA are to be published in GB. First of all, the gateway
GW must be allowed to subscribe to topic “T” in GA. Then, as
every security group has its own topic space, the topic of messages
from GA must be renamed in order to publish them into GB without
risk of topic clashing. Thus, these messages will be published in GB
as belonging to the topic “GA::T”. Finally, the gateway GW must
be allowed to publish messages belonging to topic “GA::T” in GB.
Of course, interested clients in GB must subscribe to this topic.
Consider again the example of Figure 4.3. Suppose that SB
in GB subscribes to messages of topic “GA:T”. Thus, when PA
publishes a message of topic “T”, this is notified to the gateway
GW , that adds to the topic the name of the group so obtaining
the new topic “GA::T”, and publishes it in the group GB. The new
message is later notified to SB.
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4.4 A prototype
The described architecture has been implemented in the Java pro-
gramming language as an extension of REDS (REconfigurable
Dispatching System) a pub-sub system conceived to tolerate dy-
namic reconfigurations of the dispatching infrastructure [66]. In
the REDS context, every broker is structured in two layers, the
Overlay and the Routing layer. In order to support the security
issues described above, the following components are added: a) the
SSLTransport, which allows a broker to establish a secure connec-
tion with another broker; b) the GroupManager, which allows to
manage groups; c) the ExtendedDispatchingService, which is the
extended client interface, allowing a client to act as a gateway.
4.4.1 The SSLTransport
The standard REDS architecture defines two Transport objects,
at the Overlay level, the TCPTransport and UDPTransport. In
order to support secure communications between two brokers, a
new Transport is added, the SSLTransport. This new Transport
takes advantage of the SSL protocol to guarantee confidentiality
and integrity of messages.
4.4.2 The Group Manager
The Group Manager is mainly responsible to perform the broker
and the client admission protocol. To this purpose the Group Man-
ager maintains the local TBL and the local TCT. The TBL is im-
plemented by the TBL component whose Java class is the following:
public class TBL{
void addBroker(Certificate c);
void removeBroker(Certificate c);
boolean isContained(Certificate c);
}
The methods addBroker() and removeBroker() add and re-
move a new broker with certificate c in the local TBL respectively.
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The method isContained() checks whether the certificate c is con-
tained in the local TBL. A similar class TCT is defined to manage
trusted clients which is not shown for brevity.
The group admission protocol is implemented by implementing
the following Java interface:
public interface GAP{
boolean execute(Certificate broker);
}
The operation execute receives the certificate broker of the re-
questing broker and triggers the execution of the group admission
protocol. The operation returns a boolean value which specifies
whether the requesting broker is allowed to join according to the
group admission policy. In the prototype the GAP interface has
been implemented by three classes, OBP, MBP and ABP, to support
the policies and the optimizations described above.
The client admission protocol is implemented by a class CAP
whose interface is similar to the GAP interface except it has not the
OBP, MBP and ABP instantiations. CAP is not shown for brevity.
The Group Manager encapsulates a TBL object, a TCT object,
a GAP object and a CAP object. The Group Manager is not a new
layer but rather a new component that does not alter the two-
layer structure of REDS. For instance, when there is a new request
of connection, the Overlay layer passes the request to the Group
Manager by invoking the method gap() of the GAP object. If the
group admission policy is satisfied then the requesting broker is
added as new member of the group.
4.4.3 The ExtendedDispatchingService
The ExtendedDispatchingService component is an extension of the
standard client interface supported by REDS. It allows a client
to connect to many groups and specify what groups it wants to
subscribe to or publish in. In practice, it allows the inter-group
communication. Its Java interface is the following:
public interface ExtendedDispatchingService
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extends DispatchingService{
public void open(Group g);
public void close(Group g);
public void subscribe(Filter f, Group g);
public void unsubscribe(Filter f, Group g);
public void publish(Message msg, Group g);
public Message getNextMessage(Group g);
}
The method open() opens a connection to group g, while the
method close() closes the connection to group g. The meth-
ods subscribe() and unsubscribe() respectively subscribe and
unsubscribe to filter f in the group g. The method publish() al-
lows to publish a message in the group g. Finally, the method
getNextMessage() notifies a message coming from group g.
4.5 Related Works
Many recent research has been made in the field of security for
publish/subscribe networks.
Chmielewski et al. in [67] propose a solution at the application
level, without a↵ecting the infrastructure level. In their solution,
the programmer does not care about security details. However
he/she must define what kind of security guarantees he/she wants.
In our solution, instead, the programmer does not care about se-
curity at all, because it is a service o↵ered at the infrastructure
level.
Brian Shand and Jem Rashbass in [57] guarantee security ser-
vices through the concept of access control. Those services are
applied by the first broker of the chain and then are verified by the
last broker of the chain, without a↵ecting the rest of the network.
In our case, instead, security services are applied step-by-step by
each broker of the group.
Hui Zhang et al. in [59] use the information foiling technique.
However, due to the high number of messages passing throughout
the network, this mechanism does not scale. Furthermore it wastes
a lot of network resources to deliver messages.
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Another solution has been proposed by Himanshu Khurana
in [60]. In his article, he provides the following strategy: encrypt
only a part of the messasge, that is the interesting one. In this
way, confidentiality and integrity of messages is guaranteed, but
he does not say anything about service integrity. Infact he as-
sumes that messages are correctly forwarded throughout the whole
Dispatching Network.
Paul Rabinovich and Robert Simon propose a secure message
delivery, based on messages replication and voting [61]. This solu-
tion guarantees service integrity, but it does not specify any mech-
anism to provide messages confidentiality, integrity and authenti-
cation.
In their work [62], Yuanyuan Zhao and Daniel C. Sturman dis-
cuss about dynamic access control. Their solution is based onto a
manual configuration of rules by the network administrator. Rules
are then propagated throughout the whole Dispatching Network.
Their solution, however, investigates only about access control,
without specifying nothing about the other security services.
4.6 Conclusions
With reference to a set of organizations wishing to collaborate
we have defined a secure pub-sub service that supports inter-
organization communication. The service revolves around the no-
tion of security group, a group of brokers, each representing a given
organization, interconnected by secure connections. A security
group is formed only by trusted servers, guarantees confidential-
ity and integrity in end-to-end delivery of messages and support
clients mobility. An early prototype of the service has been imple-
mented. Future e↵ort will address access control in publications
and subscriptions.
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